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Relying on Government in Comparison:
What can the United States Learn from
Abroad in Relation to Administrative
Estoppel?
BY DORIT RUBINSTEIN REISS*
Abstract
The United States' Supreme Court has never upheld a claim of
estoppel against the government. A citizen relying on the
government's advice does that at her peril: if the government
wrongfully misrepresents or misinterprets a statute it can (and by
some interpretations, must) go back on its word leaving the aggrieved
citizen with no recourse. The Supreme Court has provided many
arguments for this position, but the core of its rationale is premised
on protecting what Europeans refer to as "the principle of legality."
The principle of legality states that the Executive cannot waive
requirements from primary legislation or deviate from statutes, even
to protect an individual's reliance. This article demonstrates how
similar concerns affect the legal systems of the United Kingdom,
France, and Israel. However, embracing this principle comes with a
price. There are costs to the (often innocent) citizen who relies on the
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the United States; Margreth Barrett, Evan Lee, and Adam Scales for discussions of
the issue and comments on earlier stages. I would also like to thank the participants
in the American Society for Comparative Law YIP WIP (Yale-Illinois-Princeton
Works-in-Progress) workshop and especially my commentators, Jacqueline (Jackie)
Ross and Susan Rose-Ackerman for their insightful and thoughtful feedback. Any
errors are, of course, my own. I would like to extend my gratitude to Annie Daher,
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government's advice and suffers monetarily or may find herself
deprived of autonomy as well. There are also costs to the
government: its legitimacy may be questioned and trust lost. The
approach of the United States does not balance these costs; it
completely favors the principle of legality. The other systems that
are discussed here do a better job of balancing the interests of the
government and individual while providing protection to the relying
citizen. The U.K., France, and Israel not only protect reliance in a
number of situations, these countries also provide monetary damages
when forcing the government to adhere to its initial position would
substantially harm the public interest. By drawing on comparative
materials to underscore the interests at stake, this article
demonstrates that it is unjustified for a system to fail to protect
reliance. In offering an administrative law solution and a monetary
remedy in cases where enforcement is inappropriate, I suggest an
approach that both balances the principle of legality and also protects
citizen interest.
Introduction
Imagine the following two scenarios.
Jane collects disability benefits.' Jane wants to work, and the law
allows her to earn up to a certain amount of income and still collect
benefits. To make sure she does not exceed the permissible earnings
maximum, Jane contacts the administrative agency handling her
benefits. She asks how much she can earn and still retain her benefits.
An official responds by telling her the amount and sending her a copy
of the response in writing. The official's response turns out to be
erroneous, however, and Jane ends up unknowingly earning more
than the amount permitted under the statute. When the
administrative agency learns this, it denies Jane's benefits for the time
period she worked, basing its decision on the actual state of the law.
Jane then sues the agency, claiming it should be estopped from
denying her benefits, since the agency made the mistake when
1. This scenario is based on the facts of Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496
U.S. 414 (1990). Though the presentation here makes the injustice seem harsher-
Richmond's annuity was reinstated the following year. See generally Christopher S.
Pugsley, The Game of "Wo Can You Trust?" -Equitable Estoppel Against the Federal
Government, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 101, 108-09 (2001-2002).
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misadvising her.
Contrast this to another scenario.2 A chemical plant applies for
a permit to dump certain waste into a body of water. The plant asks
the local office of the EPA a number of questions about the meaning
of some of the requirements for the permit. The plant receives a
written answer. At least part of the answer is directly contradictory
to the way the central office of the EPA interprets the Clean Water
Act.3 The plant relies on the answer, invests in preparation of the
facility accordingly, and incurring substantial costs as a result. The
EPA, upon learning of the error, revokes the plant's permit. The plant
sues, claiming the EPA should be estopped from denying the permit
because the agency, not the plant, made the mistake.
What should the result be? Under current United States law,4
claims from each scenario will almost certainly lose.5 But should
they? Even if we accept that the agency cannot be estopped, should
no other remedy exist for the plaintiffs? As many scholars point out,
this result seems unfair.6
2. This scenario is a dramatically simplified and modified version of United
States v. Pa. Indus. Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973). Contra United States v. Eaton
Shale Co., 433 F. Supp 1256 (D. Colo. 1977) (estopping the government from asserting
its claim to invalidate and cancel a patent based on oil shale placer mining claims
that it mistakenly issued more than 21 years before). See also Mary V. Laitos, Danielle
V. Smith, and Amy E. Mang, Equitable Defenses against the Government in the Natural
Resources and Environmental Law Context, 17 PAcE ENVTL. L. REV. 273, 278- 79 (2000).
3. 33 USC §1251 and on.
4. Results are less uniform in lower courts. See generally Peter Raven-Hansen,
Regulatory Estoppel: hen Agencies Break Their Own 'Laws', 64 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1985);
Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies
for an Agency's Violation of its own Regulations or Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV.
653 (1992).
5. As developed in Part II, the Supreme Court has never formally rejected the
possibility of estoppel applying to the government, but has also never found it to
apply to a case brought before it, including Richmond. The second claim has a better
chance, since it does not require direct payment of money from the Treasury;
however, it would still be problematic -similar claims were denied, for example, in
relation to filing annual mining claims, when they were one day late, allegedly
because of misrepresentation by a federal official. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S.
84, 89-90 n.7 (1985).
6. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
569 (2005-2006) (Hereinafter Thomas W. Merrill); Pugsley, supra note 2, at 108 -09;
Raven-Hansen, supra note 5, at 1; Schwartz, supra note 5, at 653.
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This article focuses on government response to situations where
agencies7 erroneously advise private parties to act in a certain way.
Problems arise when a private party relies on agency suggestions, but
then the agency retreats from its position, leaving the party with the
costs associated with its reliance. Most courts in the United States
refer to this situation as "administrative" or "equitable estoppel." I
will apply the same terminology throughout this article. However,
the emphasis is on the effect of reliance while estoppel -as pointed
out by Schwartz -is just one of the possible remedies.8 Since other
countries may use different terms to describe similar situations, when
I discuss the possible remedies to the situation, this terminological
issue will have practical implications when I address the law in other
countries.
This article will draw on comparative research to do three things:
to add theoretical depth to the discussion, by systematically
addressing the values involved and demonstrating what is at stake;
to demonstrate the similarities and differences between the approach
taken by the United States and the United Kingdom, France and
Israel;9 and to suggest modification of the doctrine as applied in the
United States. The article suggests the United States can learn from
these systems and should make an effort to protect reliance interests.
In doing so, I embrace two solutions: a principled public law
approach similar to England, or Israel, using a case by case evaluation
as suggested by Schwartz; and as a supplement or alternative, in case
the courts of the United States are still reluctant to withdraw from the
harsh doctrine regarding estoppel, a monetary remedy in appropriate
cases.
Part I describes the United States Supreme Court's approach to
estoppel and the criticisms scholars raise against the Court's
restrictive approach to protecting reliance. Part II will analyze the
different interests at play. Part III demonstrates the approach of the
7. Naturally "agencies," like corporations, are aggregate entities, and the
behavior in question was, in practice, done by an official or several officials that may
or may not be representing the central agency. This point will be taken up later.
8. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 719-20.
9. Interestingly, as parts II and III will demonstrate, all four countries seek to
protect the legality, status, and power of its legislature. The United Kingdom, France,
and Israel, however, also give substantial weight to the other values.
[Vol. 38:1
Administrative Estoppel
United Kingdom, France and Israel, showing how these countries
balance the competing interests. Part IV addresses how the law in the
United States should change to arrive at more equitable results in
these types of cases.
I. Administrative Estoppel in the United States
A. The Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court
While lower courts have occasionally favored the individual
plaintiff in cases where an agency has misrepresented a regulation,10
the United States Supreme Court has never granted estoppel against
the government." It has long "recognized that equitable estoppel will
not lie against the Government as against private litigants," 12 making
it clear that a litigant claiming estoppel against the government
carries an extremely heavy burden. Though the Court has refused to
accept a "flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances run
against the Government," it has not expressed any clear guidelines
for when it would support such a claim.' 3 The arguments the
Supreme Court uses to justify this approach vary.' 4 In early cases,
the Court emphasized the doctrine of sovereign immunity.15 More
modern cases found that executive actions must adhere to statute,
mostly anchoring this conclusion in the separation of powers
principle, under which making law is the legislature's prerogative. 6
10. See, e.g., Corniel-Rodriguez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 532 F.2d
301 (1976) (estopping the Board of Immigration Appeals); Alaska Profl Hunters Ass'n
v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 177 F.3d 1030 (1999) (invalidating a notice published by the
Federal Aviation Administration).
11. For a detailed, thorough and thoughtful analysis of the cases on the topic, See
Raven-Hansen, supra note 5, at 1; Schwartz, supra note 5, at 653. Since this article goes
into the jurisprudence of three other countries and since the jurisprudence had been
covered in detail, I kept the discussion relatively brief, providing more detail for the
more recent cases. For elaboration on those cases, See Pugsley, supra note 2, at 108-
09.
12. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419 (1990)
13. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs, 467 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1984).
14. See Pugsley, supra note 2, at 101; Raven-Hansen, supra note 5, at 1; Schwartz,
supra note 5, at 653 (explaining the problems with the Supreme Court's reasoning in
each case).
15. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 408-09 (1917).
16. Fred Ansell, Unauthorized Conduct Of Government Agents: A Restrictive Rule Of
20151
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Again and again the Court refused to affirm executive deviation from
congressional acts. For example, in the famous case of FCIC v. Merrill,
the Court explained that "the oft-quoted observation that' [m]en must
turn square corners when they deal with the Government,' does not
reflect a callous outlook. It merely expresses the duty of the courts to
observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public
treasury." 17 Relying on this notion, the Court affirmed the FCIC's
refusal to reimburse Merrill for his destroyed crops. This is despite
the fact that he explicitly told an FCIC official that the crops were
reseeded and after the government told him the crops were insurable
and allowed him to sign an insurance policy, 8 the government
accepted his several hundred dollars.19 Scholars have criticized the
Supreme Court's estoppel jurisprudence since the Merrill decision,
pointing to the Court's insensitivity and the injustice to the
respondents. 20 Even though the Supreme Court acknowledged this
injustice, 21 commentators feel the Court did not give sufficient weight
to the inequity.22 In another case the Court explained that "[w]hen
the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of
its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as
a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined." 23
The theme of fidelity to the statute runs in more modern cases as
Equitable Estoppel Against The Government, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1026 (1986).
17. 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947) [Hereinafter Merrill]. This is especially ironic since
the decision in Merrill was based on a regulation created by the agency, not a statute:
the statute was silent on the issue.
18. Urban A. Lavery, The Declaratory Judgment in Administrative Law: A Neglected
Weapon Against Bureaucratic Aggression, 14 FED. RULES DECISIONS 479,487 (1953-1954).
The article in question describes the government's behavior as "fraud" -I would not
go that far, but am somewhat surprised - and I will go back to it - that the question
of restitution of money already paid was not discussed.
19. Id. at 382, 386.
20. Raoul Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 680 (1953-
1954); Lavery, FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS, (1953-1954); Frank C. Newman, Should
Official Advice Be Reliable? -Proposals as to Estoppel and Related Doctrines in
Administrative Law, 53 COLuM. L. REV. 374 (1953); Kenneth C. Minter, Agency - Non-
Liability of Government- Owned Corporation for Act of Agent Outside Scope of Actual
Authority, 27 TEX. L. REV. 84 (1948).
21. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 383, 386.
22. Berger, supra note 21, at 680- 81; Newman, supra note 21, at 375.
23. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 58.
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well. In OPM v. Richmond, Charles Richmond relied on a federal
employee's erroneous advice and as a result earned more than he was
allowed to, in order to continue receiving disability benefits that
Congress appropriated.24 Richmond brought suit after the Navy
denied his disability benefits.25 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit applied estoppel against the government, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.26 According to the Court, the
award Richmond sought was in "direct contravention of the federal
statute upon which his ultimate claim to the funds must rest, 5 U.S.C.
§ 8337."27 The Court explained that "[e]stoppel may never justify an
order requiring executive action contrary to a relevant statute, no
matter what statute or what facts are involved." 28 Relying on the
Appropriations Clause of the United States Constitution,29 the Court
appears to authorize a complete bar of estoppel for a whole category
of cases, stating that "judicial use of the equitable doctrine of estoppel
cannot grant respondent a money remedy that Congress has not
authorized." 30 The payment of money from the United States
Treasury must be authorized by an act of Congress, rather than by the
statements of government officials.31 Furthermore, "judicial adoption
of estoppel based on agency misinformation would.., vest authority
in these agents that Congress would be powerless to constrain." 32
Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and did not allow estoppel against the government.
The scope of Richmond is unclear. As Schwartz pointed out, the
language of the statute concerned in the case is more specific than
many appropriations bills.33 Unlike many other appropriation bills,
24. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414,416 (1990).
25. Id. (Navy saying that "the statute directs ... that the entitlement to disability
payments will end if the retired employee is 'restored to an earning capacity fairly
comparable to the current rate of pay of the position occupied at the time of
retirement."').
26. Id. at 419.
27. Id. at 424.
28. Id. at 435.
29. U.S. Const. amend. I.
30. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 426.
31. Id. at 424.
32. Id. at 429.
33. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 718-20.
20151
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the bill in Richmond specifically limits apportionment for the payment
of benefits to what is authorized by the subchapter of that bill.34
Furthermore, in his concurrence Justice Stevens disputed the
relevance of the Appropriations Clause to the facts in Richmond.35 He
stated that "[t]he Constitution contemplates appropriations that
cover programs -not individual appropriations for individual
payments." 36 Since the Appropriations Clause covers programs, not
individual cases, issues of payment based on misrepresentation to an
otherwise eligible beneficiary could still be covered. 37 Therefore, the
scope of the prohibition in Richmond continues to be unclear.
Several cases in the lower courts have been distinguished from
Richmond; the courts have estopped the government in contexts
where money was at issue. In United States v. Cox, the Federal
Defender's Office relied on guidelines promulgated by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC), the office
that administers the funds appropriated to the Federal Defender's
Office.38 The guidelines indicated that the Department of Justice
(DOJ) is responsible for the fees of psychiatric examiners who are
selected by the defense.39 The DOJ informed the AOUSC that it did
not object to its guidelines, but it later refused to pay fees owed to a
defendant's psychiatric expert.40  Therefore, since the Federal
Defender's Office reasonably relied on the DOJ's approval of
AOUSC's guidelines, it argued for estoppel against the government
for the government's refusal to pay the fees of the psychiatric expert.41
The decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina included an order that the government pay
34. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 424.
35. Id. at 435.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 435. Despite his statement, Justice Stevens still agreed with the
majority's decision and reasoned that Richmond's loss of benefits were temporary
and his additional earnings mitigated his short-term refusal of benefits. See also
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 719-20.
38. United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431 (4th Cir. 1992).
39. Id. at 1434.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1432.
[Vol. 38:1
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the fees.42 On appeal, the appellate court distinguished the case from
Richmond, emphasizing that unlike previous cases, the entity
requesting the money is a federal agency. 43 Therefore, there were no
concerns about unequal treatment between private citizens and
estoppel would not undermine Congressional authority in
appropriating funds.44 The court reasoned, "application of the
estoppel doctrine in the present case will have the opposite effect -
encouraging the orderly appropriation of funds by preventing
government entities from refusing to make budgetary expenditures
on items for which they have previously accepted financial
responsibility."45 Therefore, restricting the application of Richmond in
the circumstances, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.46
In Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center, Inc. v. United States,47
another case distinguished from Richmond, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit refused to summarily dismiss a claim
of estoppel against the government because there were material
issues of fact about the existence of the estoppel. The court concluded
that "[t]he Richmond holding is not so broad. Richmond is limited to
'claim[s] for the payment of money from the Public Treasury contrary
to a statutory appropriation."'48 Since Burnside-Ott's claim for a right
to monetary payment from the Public Treasury was based on its
contract with the Navy rather than a statute, Richmond did not
apply.49 Lower courts have distinguished cases like these, when the
party requesting monetary payment was a federal agency rather than
an individual citizen and when the payment was based upon a
contractual duty rather than a statutory entitlement, from Richmond.
Fidelity to the statute, important as it is, is not the only rationale
the Court provided for its narrow and restrictive protection of
42. Id. at 1433.
43. Id. at 1435.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1434-35.
47. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center, Inc. v. Unites States, 985 F.2d 1574
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
48. Id. at 1581 (quoting Richmond, 496 U.S. at 424).
49. Id.
2015]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
reliance. Another argument raised by the Court was the concern
about the effect on the public fisc. In cases where estoppel would
require payment of benefits to citizens, arguments include concerns
about the negative effect on the public fisc from allowing estoppel.50
It is unclear, however, whether the burden on the public fisc would
derive from the need to litigate estoppel claims, 51 the administrative
burden of reopening and reexamining all cases where there is an
alleged error,52 or the need to pay back the claimant if the government
made a misrepresentation.53 In terms of the administrative burden
on courts and agencies, as Justice Marshall pointed out in more than
one dissent, the Supreme Court's refusal to categorically bar estoppel
claims against the government means that such claims were viable
and sometimes accepted in lower courts. In his dissent in Richmond,
Justice Marshall further writes, "The door has been open for almost
30 years, with an apparently unnoticeable drain on the public fisc.
This reality is persuasive evidence that the majority's fears are
overblown."5 4 For the cost of reimbursing or providing damages to
an individual who relied on misrepresentation (since estoppel only
applies to those who rely on a misrepresentation), there needs to be
evidence that paying claimants back in these cases would create a
serious drain on the public purse. If a decision like Richmond came
up once in ten years, for example, it would not likely make a big
difference to the Navy's disability payments. Charles Richmond's
case is an especially painful example of the results of the Supreme
Court's strict doctrine. He was entitled to the money until he took the
extra work, and he would not have taken the extra work without the
agency's advice. Therefore, he lost the money he was entitled to as a
direct result. Would protecting his reliance really be such a drain on
the public fisc? Charles Richmond lost benefits amounting to $3,993.
Even in 2008, at the height of the financial crisis, and after adjusting
for current value, paying Charles Richmond that amount would not
50. See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 n.4 (1981); Heckler, 467 U.S. at 63;
Richmond, 496 U.S. at 428, 433.
51. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 433.
52. See generally Hansen, 450 U.S. at 788.
53. See generally Heckler, 467 U.S. at 63.
54. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 442.
[Vol. 38:1
Administrative Estoppel
have bankrupted the government.55
Finally, arguments which oppose estoppel against the
government include the Court's concern that if it allows government
estoppel, government officials will be more likely to either
purposefully offer erroneous advice to circumvent congressional
requirements or collude with citizens to defraud the government.56
The latter suggests a complicated plot in which a government
official - in most cases, a relatively low-level official - knowingly
gives wrong advice, counting on the agency being bound under the
rules of estoppel, in order to subvert congressional commands with
impunity.5 7 The fear is that this will happen in all cases - even
though estoppel is an equitable remedy focused on the particular
case. The Court seems to think that under the rules governing agency
deviation, it would be bound to treat all subsequent cases according
to the wrong representation. However, an agency is not always
continually bound by the decision of a low-ranking official. Agencies
can deviate from, and therefore fix, previous decisions as long as it is
not "arbitrary and capricious" to do so. An agency's potential
explanation that, "the previous case was based on error and though
we respect that decision to protect the citizen's reliance and not
penalize that citizen for our own error, the correct legal decision in
the present case is different," is reasonable-not arbitrary or
capricious. Thus, while collusion between officials and citizens may
be a concern, it may also be overemphasized. Further, the potential
for abuse is not always a convincing reason to avoid giving justice to
those who deserve it.58 Any system can be abused. The question
whether the potential for abuse is great enough to justify barring
55. Id. at 418.
56. See generally Heckler, 467 U.S. at 65- 66.
57. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 428 ("If, for example, the President or Executive Branch
officials were displeased with a new restriction on benefits imposed by Congress to
ease burdens on the fisc (such as the restriction imposed by the statutory change in
this case) and sought to evade them, agency officials could advise citizens that the
restrictions were inapplicable. Estoppel would give this advice the practical force of
law, in violation of the Constitution.")
58. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal 2d 728, 731-739 (Cal. 1968) ("In the past we have
rejected the argument that we should deny recovery upon a legitimate claim because
other fraudulent ones may be urged".... "we cannot let the difficulties of adjudication
frustrate the principle that there be a remedy for every substantial wrong.").
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compensation deserves its own discussion. Another problem with
this theory is the danger to such an official from internal penalties if
the digression is discovered. If not discovered by the higher echelons
of the agency, the digression will probably not go to court. Hence, the
Courts' acceptance, or otherwise, of estoppel against the government
is not going to make a big difference to the motivation of officials.
A number of other arguments in favor of a bright-line rule
barring estoppel against the government have been raised, however,
these arguments are not persuasive. More than one Supreme Court
Justice recognizes that there are important interests on the other side,
primarily of fairness. 59 Even here though, the Court sees this as the
interest of the individual in contrast to the interest of the public. In a
democracy, however, individual citizens make up the general public
and their interests are to be counted. Even though individual rights
are to be balanced against the rights of the general public, everyone
collectively benefits from agencies that accurately administer the law
and correct their mistakes when appropriate.
Beyond this, the Court does not address the potential impacts of
its policy on citizen autonomy. In a world where the government
regulates many activities, where businesses often need a permit
before action and citizens can be fined for statutory violations it is
hard for individuals to act confidently without knowing how an
enforcing or permitting agency interprets a regulation.
Consequently, the agency is the natural (and sometimes the only)
source for citizens to turn to in order to learn how a regulatory
scheme is interpreted. Furthermore, the Court does not address the
overall harm to the trust in government or the harm to its
legitimacy-both of which are already vulnerable in modern states
generally and the United States in particular.60
Finally, agencies, themselves, have an interest in having citizens
rely on their decisions. Compliance will not only be quicker if citizens
59. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 387-88.
60. Robert A. Kagan, The Organization of Administrative Justice System: the Role of
Political Mistrust, (2006) (unpublished paper on file with original author); JOHN
GASTIL, BY POPULAR DEMAND: REVITALIZING REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY THROUGH
DELIBERATIVE ELECTIONS (University of California Press, 2000); Michael W. Dowdle,
Public Accountability: conceptual, Historical, and Epistemic Mappings (Michael W.
Dowdle ed., Cambridge University Press 2006).
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do not need to check externally whether an agency's advice is
accurate, but rates of compliance will be also higher if compliance
protects citizens even when agencies are wrong. These arguments
will be developed further in Part II of this article.
B. Deviations
In 1973, Michael Asimow conducted a survey on federal
administrative agencies where he found that many agencies have no
written policy about mistaken advice. Despite the absence of a policy,
agency officials found it "unthinkable" that sanctions could be taken
against individuals who in good faith relied on agency advice, if it
provided in a customary manner by the agency.61 Asimow's survey
did point out that agency heads do not see themselves as bound by
reliance on informal advice by low-level employees, however. 62 This
suggests agencies themselves recognized that reliance on their advice
deserves some protection, but limitations existed on their willingness
to offer that protection.
The Court has generally refused to declare a complete bar of
estoppel against the government and lower courts were left with the
problem of identifying under what conditions estoppel against the
government will apply. Lower courts have granted estoppel against
the government when the government official was acting in some
form of "affirmative misconduct." 63 Unfortunately, lower courts did
not define the term "affirmative misconduct." 64 And in no case did
the Supreme Court affirm such a decision. In Schweiker v. Hansen, the
Court in essence said that it will know affirmative misconduct when
it sees it - and it has not seen it yet.65 This has not prevented appellate
61. MICHAEL ASIMOW, ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES 30- 31 (1973).
62. Id. at 32.
63. U.S. v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38,118 S.Ct. 186; Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785,
788 (1981).
64. See Pugsley, supra note 2, at 108 for criticism of the standard's vagueness and
lack of definition.
65. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981). "This Court has never decided
what type of conduct by a government employee will estop the government from
insisting upon compliance with valid regulations governing the distribution of
welfare benefits. In two cases involving denial of citizenship, the Court has declined
to decide whether even "affirmative misconduct" would estop the government from
2015]
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or district courts from finding for citizens on these grounds from time
to time. 66 However, as the Supreme Court held in Richmond, "we
have reversed every finding of estoppel that we have reviewed." 67
Lower courts have also granted estoppel against the government
when the government was acting in a proprietary function. This has
happened when the government acts as a private individual in the
market - rather than as a sovereign entity. 68 Interestingly, this
distinction is actually used in various contexts in civil law countries,
and does have important practical implications. 69
The Supreme Court has also occasionally deviated from its
policy of not granting estoppel against the government. However, in
these cases the Supreme Court does not use the term "estoppel" when
describing the remedy allowed to the winning party. Instead, the
Court calls it "entrapment by estoppel" and "equitable tolling."
The first remedy the Supreme Court uses is the doctrine of
entrapment by estoppel. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that
the government cannot criminally prosecute private individuals
acting in accordance with government advice.70 These cases are
denying citizenship, for in neither case was "affirmative misconduct" involved ....
This is another in that line of cases." See also Hansen, 450 U.S. at 788-89; Schwartz,
supra note 5, 707 (describing the Court's approach to the issue as "coy, 'we'll know it
when we see it"').
66. Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1976)(INS officer
violated INS regulation requiring him to warn applicant for visa under special terms
that getting married will result in denial of visa, and she got married in the interim;
government was estopped from deporting her); Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d
1155 (7th Cir. 1982) (estopping Post Office from denying applicant's claim for
damages based on assurances by the post office workers that it will be insured up to
50,000); See also Portmann, 674 F.2d at 1166-67 (reviewing jurisprudence on
affirmative conduct in the courts up to that date).
67. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 422 (1990)
68. John F. Conway, Equitable Estoppel of the Federal Government: An Application of
the Proprietary Function Exception to the Traditional Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 707, 708 -
09 n.5, 719- 22 (1987).
69. FRANK JOHNSON GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS, NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF THE UNITED STATES,
ENGLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY 151 (Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 2000); James E.
Pfander, Government Accountability in Europe: A Comparative Assessment, 35 GEO.
WASH. INT'L. L. REV. 611, 623-25 (2003).
70. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973); Raley v.
State of Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
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relatively easy to explain. As Joshua Schwartz pointed out in his
article, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel
Remedies for an Agency's Violation of its own Regulations or Other
Misconduct, considerations of due process and the gravity of the
private interests at stake can support estoppel against the
government in criminal cases.71 However, the Court did not explain
in detail why the considerations against estoppel in other cases do not
operate here or why decisions allowing deportation do not affect
interests just as grave, even though they are classified as civil and not
criminal.72 Mr. Schwartz suggests that, in many of the INS cases, the
Court's refusal of estoppel did not create an absolute bar to reapply
for citizenship or status,73 but - especially if there was a
deportation-the deprivation could be very substantial.74
Deportation would normally lead to the applicant being barred from
the United States for five years and will be a factor in subsequent
decisions, and the result of relocation to another country can be grave
and irrevocable.75
"Equitable tolling," the second remedy, involves cases that are
harder to explain.76 In a series of cases decided not long before
Richmond, the Supreme Court set aside statutory or regulatory
requirements to provide a remedy - frequently monetary - to
claimants. The Court described what it was doing as "equitable
tolling," or forcing a waiver, but the differences from estoppel are
hard to identify. The first case to use the doctrine of equitable tolling
was Honda v. Clark.77 In Clark, there was disagreement between the
United States government and the petitioners, about the correct
exchange rate for repaying assets the government took from a
Japanese bank under the Trading with the Enemy Act. 78 The lower
71. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 728-32.
72. Lenni B. Benson, By Hook or by Cook: Exploring the Legality of an INS Sting
Operation, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 813 (1994).
73. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 737-38.
74. Benson, supra note 108, at 813.
75. Id. at 822.
76. This discussion draws heavily on Schwartz's excellent analysis. Schwartz,
supra note 5, at 686-93.
77. Honda v. Clark, 87 S.Ct. 1188 (1967).
78. 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 1.
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courts dismissed the case because the action was not brought during
the sixty-day period dictated in the Act.79 Claimants were also
waiting for the conclusion of a class action suit on the same issue (rate
of exchange), and they understandably assumed that the results of
that litigation would apply to all future and current claimants, even
those who - like claimants - were not part of the class.80 The
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the issue was not one of
estoppel. Instead, the limitation period was, based on the legislative
scheme, tolled until the litigation was over. The Court's
interpretation of the statutory scheme was extremely broad8l and
emphasized the lack of harm to the government when accepting the
claims.82 Since the assets were not part of the general public fisc the
government loses nothing when providing such assets to claimants.8 3
While this suggests a difference from Richmond, that difference was
later denied in Bowen v. City of New York, where the Supreme Court
accepted the argument of equitable tolling when it said,
Petitioners argue that Honda stands for the proposition that
equitable tolling is permissible only in cases in which the public
treasury is not directly affected. We decline to hold that the
doctrine of equitable tolling is so limited. When application of the
doctrine is consistent with Congress' intent in enacting a particular
statutory scheme, there is no justification for limiting the doctrine
84
The Court further clarified its approach to equitable tolling in
79. Clark, 87 S.Ct. at 1189.
80. Id. at1191-94.
81. Id. at 1194-96; See also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 686-89.
82. Clark, 87 S.Ct. at 1197.
83. Id. "This case is, however, wholly different from those cases on which the
Government primarily relies, where the public treasury was directly affected. Here
Congress established a method for returning seized enemy assets to United States
creditors, assets that were never contemplated as finding their way permanently into
the public fisc."
84. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 473, 479-82 (1986) (using equitable
tolling to allow claimants who have not filed for judicial review within the 60 day
statute of limitations established by section 2 05(g) of the Social Security Act to join a
class action brought by severely mentally impaired individuals whose applications
for disability benefits were denied by an alleged secret and illegal policy of the Social
Security Administration).
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Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs.85 In Irwin, the Court explained
that it would apply a presumption of equitable tolling to statutes of
limitations since "[sluch a principle is likely to be a realistic
assessment of legislative intent as well as a practically useful
principle of interpretation . . . Congress, of course, may provide
otherwise if it wishes to do so."86 However, the Court limited the
circumstances in which equitable tolling would be available to
claimants actively pursuing remedies and to claimants somehow
tricked by the other party into allowing the deadline to pass.87 In
subsequent cases the Court further restricted the application of
equitable tolling when it suggested that the statutes of limitations
falls into two categories: defenses that can be waived and
jurisdictional limitations that cannot.88 The Court also stated that if it
previously interpreted the statute as creating a jurisdictional
limitation period, that previous interpretation stands and equitable
tolling is not available. 89
Of a similar vein are the cases involving a "forced waiver."
Those cases address the administrative law requirement that, barring
the narrow exceptions, an applicant should exhaust its in-agency
remedies before appealing to the court system. This doctrine is well
established in the administrative jurisprudence of the United States90
and is embodied in several statutes.91 In Eldridge and Bowen v. City of
New York, the Court applied a waiver of administrative remedies even
though the plaintiffs did not request a waiver and the agencies
involved did not give them one.92 This decision of the Court was
85. 498 U.S. 89 (1990)
86. Id. at 95-96.
87. Id. at 96. It should be noted that neither circumstance was in place in Honda
or in Bowen - this is a retrenchment.
88. John R. Sand and Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 150-52 (2008);
Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).
89. Gravel, 552 U.S. at 137-38; See also, Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1203.
90. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-96 (1969).
91. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Social Security Act) (conditioning judicial review
on exhaustion of remedies); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 327-30 (1976)
(hereinafter Eldridge). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (The Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PLRA)) (requiring a prisoner to exhaust any available administrative
remedies before challenging prison conditions in federal court).
92. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 328-30 (holding that plaintiff did not raise with the
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based mostly on considerations of justice.93 Once again, the Court
refused to allow the agency to use an otherwise legitimate claim
because of justice; though the Court also refused to label what they
were doing "estoppel."
In sum, whatever language the Court used, it seemed to prohibit
government from raising an otherwise valid claim for equitable
reasons - like estoppel.94 The removed requirement was procedural,
exhaustion, rather than substantive. However, treating this as a
meaningful difference - as the English jurisprudence suggested it
could be -runs into a problem. At least some of the estoppel cases,
like Hansen, where the unmet requirement was a written petition,
involve procedural requirements.
C. Dissents and Scholarly Criticisms, Suggestions for Reform
Shortly after FCIC v. Merrill, Frank C. Newman mentioned
specific schemes that protect a citizen's reliance on the government's
advice in the Columbia Law Review.95 Newman suggested a general
statute would create a remedy for citizens relying on advice from the
government, which in essence would overturn the "no estoppel
against the government" doctrine.96 Furthermore, since Merrill, the
doctrine was taken to task several times with commentators generally
Secretary his claim before bringing it to court, and leaving the matter to the
Secretary's judgment is inappropriate). Bowen, 476 U.S. at 483- 85 (allowing into the
class members who have not exhausted remedies, seeing this as another case where
the equities demand that the court overtake the Secretary's discretion to waive
exhaustion).
93. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 689-92.
94. Id. at 688- 89 (reminding us that the basis for relief was weaker than some of
the estoppel cases in which the Court denied relief-there was no actual
misrepresentation here).
95. Newman, supra note 21, at 375-76.
96. Id; See also Merrill 332 U.S. at 384 (saying, "Whatever the form in which the
Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government
takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the
Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The scope of this authority
may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by delegated legislation,
properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even though, as
here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his
authority." The language in Merrill was harsher than in Heckler, Hansen, or Richmond
because it suggests that estoppel may never lay against the government as long as
the advising official is stepping beyond her or his authority.)
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not finding sufficient justification for its harshness.97 Two interesting
takes on solving the estoppel problem that deserve special discussion
are discussed below.
Professor Raven-Hansen suggests one principled way for the
Court to address estoppel.98 His article highlights the potential
tension between the Accardi doctrine,99 under which agencies are
required to follow their own regulations 00 and the Supreme Court's
restrictive approach to estoppel.101 He sees the problem as a need to
balance the interests of private reliance and reliance on agency "law,"
that is broadly defined to include all agency pronouncements, with
public interests in the legislative policies that may be overturned:10 2
estoppel should be available if the private reliance interest in
agency obedience to its own law outweighs the public interest in
those legislative policies that would be affected by regulatory
estoppel in a given case.
Professor Raven-Hansen sees estoppel as an issue that comes up
when an agency breaks its own law.1 03 In his view, the guiding
principle for distinguishing between types of estoppel is to look at
what type of law is at stake, and how it affects the level of
expectations that the agency will be correct in the representation.
Raven-Hansen suggests that if the government's wrongful conduct
was a violation of an agency regulation and the party is claiming she
relied on that regulation, her reliance should be protected. This is
because the process by which regulations are promulgated makes it
97. Ansell, supra note 17, at 1026; Benson, supra note 73, at 813; Conway, supra
note 69, at 707; Deborah H. Eisen, Schweiker v. Hansen: Equitable Estoppel Against the
Government, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 609 (1981-1982); Stephen Holstrom, Estopping Big
Brother: The Constitution, Too, Has Square Corners 33 Western NEW ENG. L. REV. 163,
164 (2011); Pugsley, supra note 2, at 101; Raven-Hansen, supra note 5, at 1; David K.
Thompson, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 551(1979); Deborah
Walruth, Estopping the Federal Government: Still Waiting for the Right Case, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 191 (1984).
98. Raven-Hansen, supra note at 1.
99. Accardi, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
100. Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 7; Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77;
See id. at 859, 873-881 (2009).
101. Raven-Hansen, supra note 5.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 1-2.
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predictable that the rules will create reliance and expectations. Raven-
Hansen calls this "objective reliance." 104 If the person relies on other
agency materials that were either intended to confer benefits and
protections on the public, or were created through a formal process
(e.g., public participation or publication), the agency creates public
expectations that it will comply with these statements. 05 These same
expectations attach to a long-standing and well-known agency
practice.106 In all these situations, the pronouncement from the
agency is "material" for the public, and reliance on it should be both
assumed and be protected.
On the other hand, if there is no public participation in the
rulemaking process, and the relied upon guidance is either issued for
the agency's convenience or on individual advice, the same
expectations of compliance cannot be assumed.10 7 A plaintiff whose
claim is based on this type of advice must show subjective and
reasonable detrimental reliance. 08 No reasonable reliance to the
party's detriment-no estoppel.' 09 Similarly, in the case of agency
misconduct, reliance interests will not be preserved unless the injured
party demonstrates reasonable detrimental reliance." 0 However, if
the misconduct is especially egregious, courts should relax this
requirement."'
While this approach appears to be a carefully detailed and
principled way to distinguish between cases, it may not be the correct
approach. Professor Raven-Hansen defines estoppel as a situation in
which an agency wants to deviate from its own law; whether that be
a formal legislative regulation, or an individual representation.
Raven-Hansen emphasizes the question whether the representation
has the force of law, as his yardstick for the different tests. However,
this focus does not necessarily capture the equities of the situation.
104. Id. at 47.
105. Id. at 48.
106. Id. For example, this could account for the D.C. Circuit's decision in Alaska
Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
107. Raven-Hansen, supra note 5, at 49.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 50.
111. Id.
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Under Raven-Hansen's approach, a citizen relying on the advice of
an official, as to what agency regulations require, will have a less
protection and a heavier burden of proof than a citizen who simply
relies on a published agency manual. Is this fair? Is it wrong for a
citizen to assume agency officials know the regulations of the agency
under which they are employed? Is the individual who seeks out an
official for current agency information less deserving than the person
who reads an online agency document which may or may not be up-
to-date? While Raven-Hansen suggests a solution that appears to
have a relatively clear application, it may not appropriately account
for the balance of considerations. Professor Raven-Hansen's
approach also fails to directly address the need to protect the rule of
law (or the principle of legality, as it is called in Europe) and
Congress' legislative authority. What happens in cases of direct
contradiction with congressional law? Part of the problem is that the
values at stake are not sufficiently addressed in a systematic way.
This article suggests a detailed inquiry into them is the first step to
creating a test.
In another systematic and thorough treatment of the estoppel
issue Professor Schwartz 12 criticizes the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, and suggests a different approach to solving the
estoppel dilemma. Professor Schwartz's approach has two steps.
First, he suggests a solution based on existing public law concepts,
under which a party will request the agency to waive the statute,
regulation or policy. For cases that fit certain special criteria and for
which the first solution would not work, he then suggests a
constitutional, due process-based approach.1" 3 Both of his tests allow
for careful weighing of the equities, and as I address later, are my
recommended solution for considering whether to apply estoppel
(though not the only solution - I propose a monetary remedy where
estoppel is inappropriate).
II. The Dilemma of Reliance on Government
Representations
This section discusses in further detail what is at stake when we
112. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 653.
113. Id. Professor Schwartz' solution will be discussed in some depth in part IV of
the article, which is why this discussion is relatively short.
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consider protecting a citizen's reliance on government
representation. It draws on literature from the United Kingdom,
France, and Israel to both add theoretical depth to the aforementioned
arguments and raise some arguments uncommon in the United
States. The section suggests that the balance of considerations
supports some protection of reliance, although not in every case, and
not necessarily through estoppel. This section also suggests that a
case by case approach, while adding complexity and costs, is more
appropriate than a categorical bar.
A. The Separation of Powers/Legality Argument and its Weaknesses
While in previous cases sovereign immunity was the basis for
not allowing estoppel, 14 that argument is rarely used in the estoppel
cases since Merrill.115 Merrill and its progeny emphasized the need to
respect and support Congress' authority over agencies, referring to
the deference as "the duty of all courts to observe the conditions
defined by Congress for charging the public treasury."116 This
argument can be framed as a problem of separation of powers:
Estoppel means that the executive has the right to overturn
congressional legislation. In Richmond, the government argues
estoppel should not be upheld against the government, an argument
the court accepts, finding, "to recognize estoppel based on the
misrepresentations of Executive Branch officials would give those
misrepresentations the force of law, and thereby invade the
legislative province reserved to Congress." 117
The Court persuasively reasoned that officials should not be
allowed to circumvent or deviate from statutory law by making
representations to citizens.118 This argument has been directly
addressed by the jurisdictions of France, the United Kingdom, and
Israel using "the principle of legality."119 In spite of a difference in
114. Utah Power & Light Co., 243 U.S. at 408-09.
115. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 420 (1990) (stating that
Merrill was "the leading case in our modern line of estoppel decisions.").
116. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 386.
117. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 423.
118. See Ansell, supra note 17, at 1036-38.
119. SOREN J. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7
(Oxford University Press. 2000) [hereinafter SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS].
[Vol. 38:1
Administrative Estoppel
terminology, the issue is similar. There is a reluctance to allow
agencies to undermine the choices made by the democratically
elected legislature1 20  In extreme cases, the government's
representation can clearly deviate from enacted statutory law' 2 ' (that
was, for example, the case in Richmond where agency advice directly
violated a statutory requirement. 122
None of the countries examined here are willing to directly
enforce a decision that clearly deviates from a statute.123 In other
words, neither France, the U.K., nor Israel are willing to allow an
administrative agency to act outside its mandate, "ultra vires." 124 In
spite of the substantial powers of the administrative state125 and the
120. The United States is a presidential system. Therefore, its model for separation
of powers is different from the one used in parliamentary democracies such as
Britain. But the problem of respecting the will of the people's representatives exists
under either system.
121. Richmond, 496 U.S at 417-418. The requirement in question was that the
amount earned not exceed 80% of the previous earning in each of the preceding two
years; the agency official instructed Richmond according to the previous statutory
scheme, which averaged the amount of the earning in those two years. Since
Richmond made very little money in the year before his request, when averaged
between the two years he would have been below the threshold; but when calculated
for the last year alone, he exceeded 80% of his previous earning capacity;
122. ARIEL BENDOR, ESTOPPEL IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 65 (Hebrew University
1994) [hereinafter Bendor], chapter 4, para. 135, p. 65, suggests a different variety of
the Separation of Powers principle. This argument, which he calls the "sophisticated"
or "clever" version of separation of powers, suggests that since estoppel is applied
after a balancing of considerations of equity and leaves quite a bit of discretion for
the court, the effect of allowing courts to estop the government will be to give the
courts the power to excuse the other branches from following legal requirements,
hence allowing the courts to circumvent the will of the elected branches.
123. See discussion supra in Part III.
124. R v. Lockwood, [1950] 1 Eng.Rep. 148 (K.B).;Rhyl U.D.C. v. Rhyl Amusements
Ltd., [1959] 1 All E.R. 257; Howell v. Falmouth Bout Construction Co. Ltd., [1951] A.C.
837; United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60 (1940). SOREN J. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 7 (saying, "All developed systems of administrative
law include principles of auto-limitation (non-fettering) and legality (ultra vires,
legalit6)").
125. KEVIN B. SMITH & MICHAEL J. LICARI, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: POWER AND
POLITICS IN THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (Roxbury Publishing Company
2006) [hereinafter Smith & Licari, Public Administration]; Y. MENY & A. KNAPP,
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE: BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY GERMANY
(Oxford University Press 3d ed. 1998).
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inevitably broad discretion of bureaucrats, 126 democratic theory still
emphasizes that the role of bureaucrats is to implement the will of the
elected legislature.127 The traditional view was that administrators do
not make policy, they just implement it.128 The policy-
implementation dichotomy has been challenged as a poor
representation of reality: implementation carries with it some
discretion and therefore often creates a need for policy making. 29
However, it is still the official doctrine of the administrative state.
This is for good reason-where there is a clear contradiction the
legislature's will must govern the implementation of statutes.
126. GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL
REGULATORY AGENCIES (Richard A. Brody, et al., eds., Pergamon Press 1987); STEVEN P.
CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY
GOVERNMENT (Princeton University Press 2007); Giandomenico Majone, The Regulatory
State and its Legitimacy Problems, 22 WEST EUROPEAN POLrIcs 1 (1999); Sweet, Alec Stone
and Thatcher, Mark, Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 74 (2002)
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss-papers/74 [herinafter Thatcher and Sweet].
127. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS § I (Harvard University Press.
1993); John Kingdom, Britain, in COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 13 G.A. Chandler
ed. 2000) [hereinafter Kingdom]. But see, for a counter perspective: Terrence Kelly,
Unlocking the Iron Cage: Public Administration in the Deliberative Democratic Theory of Jfirgen
Habermas, 36 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY 38 (2004); Edward Rubin, The Myth of
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REv. (2004-2005).
128. Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, Image IV Revisited: Executive and Political
Roles, 1 GOVERNANCE 1, 2-3 (1988). (The classic image of the relationship between
bureaucrats and politicians was that politicians make policy and bureaucrats
implement it loyally. But as pointed out by the authors, that image is no longer
accepted). See also Robert D. Putnam, The Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants
in Britain, Germany, and Italy, in THE MANDARINS OF WESTERN EUROPE: THE POLITICAL
ROLE OF ToP CIVIL SERVANTS (Mattei Dogan ed. 1975).
129. James H. Svara, The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of Politics and
Administration in the Past and Future of Public Administration, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 176
(2001); James H. Svara, Complementarity of Politics and Administration as a Legitimate
Alternative to the Dichotomy Model, 30 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY (1999); Tansu Demir
& Ronald C. Nyhan, The Politics-Administration Dichotomy: An Empirical Search for
Correspondence between Theory and Practice., 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 81 (2008). But see B.
Guy PETERS, POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS IN THE POLITICS OF POLICY-MAKING § 1
(Routledge. 2002) (although not accepting the dichotomy, there are real differences
in the role and functioning of politicians and bureaucrats); see also Tansu Demir,
Politics and Administration: Three Schools, Three Approaches, and Three Suggestions, 31
ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY & PRAXIS 503 (2009) (describing three schools of thought-
the classic dichotomy between politics and administration, a political school that sees
bureaucrats as politicians, and interaction, which lies in between).
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In democratic countries, citizens elect the legislature, but do not
have the same amount of control over the Executive branch. Most
political actors are internally appointed and not directly elected to
their position.130 Even in a purely parliamentary system like Israel
and the U.K., ministers may have been elected to parliament, but
most of the officials likely to be involved in the issues of
administrative estoppel were not elected; and the government serves
with the confidence of the legislature and is itself bound by its laws.13'
The democratic idea of implementing the will of the people suggests
that the legislature, who directly represents the people, should be the
deciding body.132
Similarly, concerns about bureaucratic power and a desire to
prevent agencies from increasing that power without limit support
130. This is true in the United States for all executives at the federal level except
the president, of course. In France to the president is elected, and then appoints the
rest of the government. Most of the civil service is, however, not elected.
131. Kingdom, supra note 174, at 13. As opposed to the parliamentary system in
general, in the specific case of Britain there is controversy about the degree of control
government has over Parliament. Further, some in the past saw Parliament as no
more than a rubber stamp for the government's will. For instance, see the article by
Susan Sterett, Judicial Review in Britain, 26 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES (1994) and
the book by David Judge, REPRESENTATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN BRITAIN 199-
200 (Routledge. 1999) (explaining that the government can legislate when and how
it wants). On the other hand, others see Parliament as more influential, such as
Matthew Flinder, Alexandra Kelso, and Meg Russell. See Matthew Flinder &
Alexandra Kelso, Mind the Gap: Political Analysis, Public Expectations and the
Parliamentary Decline Thesis, 13 THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 249; Russell, M., Parliament: Emasculated or Emancipated?, Political Studies
Association conference, University of Manchester, Manchester (2009); Palgrave
Macmillan, in CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURES (Robert Hazel ed. 2008); Anthony King, Modes
of Executive- Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France, and West Germany, 1
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY 11(1976); COLIN TURPIN & ADAM TOMKiNS, BRITISH
GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 567- 72 (Cambridge University Press. 2007).
132. M.D. McCubbins, et al., Structure and Process, Policy and Politics: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989). But cf.
Dowdle, Public Accountability: conceptual, Historical, and Epistemic Mappings.
2006; Rubin, MICH. L. REV. (2004-2005); KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (Yale University Press 2d ed. 1963) (explaining the challenges to
the idea that elections really represent voters' preferences.) There is also a tension
between this idea of the people's will and expertise, but in democratic countries the
nature of the system is that the legislature - un-expert as it is - has the final word.
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subjecting it to a higher authority-i.e., statutory law.133 If the idea of
separation of powers is to set one powerful governmental authority
against another, and thus bind and limit them both,134 the
bureaucracy is extremely powerful in the modern state.135 It often
combines powers that, in theory, are separated between the other
branches. 36 More than any other authority it needs to be limited. The
legislature is the natural body to limit it.137
Finally, the principle of legality protects the idea of the rule of
law. The argument is that the government should be subject to the
written, formal law no less than the governed. 38 The government
cannot be allowed to deviate from the law except in exceptional
circumstances. Allowing the government to deviate because it has
made a mistake (or intentionally lied about what the law is) seems to
create a dangerous loophole. That is part of the logic behind the
Accardi doctrine under which agencies are bound by their own
133. Bendor, supra note 123, at 6.
134. Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for
Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 362 (2008); Peter M. Shane, Political
Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of
Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161 (1995).
135. James Q. Wilson & Patricia Rachal, Can Government Regulate Itself?, THE
PUBLIC INTEREST(1977); JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (Brookings Institute 1990); Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent
of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1332 (2008).
136. Dobkin, supra note 181, at 362; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157(1996); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
State (in Symposium: Changing Images of the State), 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994). Some,
of course, suggest that this is not unique to agencies: there is no strict separation of
powers in the United States. See M. M. FEELEY & E RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (Cambridge
University Press 1998).
137. M.D. McCubbins, et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. AND ORG. 243 (1987); Louis Fisher, Micromanagement by Congress:
Reality and Mythology, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE
EXECUTrIVE BRANCH (Crovitz & Rabkin eds., 1989); Mathiew D. McCubbins & Thomas
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 165 (1984); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of
Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN (Chubb and Peterson ed.
1989). But cf. ABERBACH, supra note 182.
138. Julia Black, Regulation as Facilitation: Negotiating the Genetic Revolution, 61
MOD. L. REV. 621 (1998).
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regulations. 139 It is also part of the concern about collusion that will
be discussed later.
As powerful as the legislative power argument is, it has limits:
first, it does not really capture many scenarios of reliance, even those
addressed in the cases decided by the United States Supreme Court,
where the agency misrepresentation does not directly deviate from
statute. Second, it ignores the realities of the modern administrative
state. Third, even this argument is not absolute, and in appropriate
cases countervailing values should be allowed to trump over it, as
developed below. Finally, protecting the legislature's will is, in some
cases, an extremely strong argument against enforcing action in
contravention of a legislative command, but it's not as strong an
argument against other remedies.
1. Clear Illegality?
Sometimes, the issue is clear illegality. In OPM v. Richmond, the
statute had been changed and the agency's advice simply ignored the
change and cited the old statutory scheme. But even in the United
States, a violation of the statutory scheme that is not always the case.
In Merrill, the issue was not a violation of a statutory command. The
inability to insure reseeded crops was embedded in the agency's
legislative regulations. In Schweiker too, the issue was violation of a
procedural requirement in an agency regulation.140 In that case, a
mother applying for social security benefits was erroneously advised
that she was not eligible, and was not advised to file a written
petition-in contrast to the agency's manual. The statute in question
only allowed benefits if a petition was filed. The agency's regulation
interpreted this as requiring a "written petition." In both cases the
Court explicitly treated the regulation as law, but for the purpose of
this specific argument, the separation of powers or legality argument,
the situation is not quite similar.141 In one sense, there's a stronger
case for refusing to protect expectations there: If one justification for
the principle of legality is the rule of law, assuring the government
will also be subject to rules and that it will be a "government of laws
139. Merrill, supra note 7, at 586-87.
140. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981).
141. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 380.
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and not of men,"142 the agency should be held to formal law,
including its own regulations. However, the argument that the will
of the elected legislature should trump over the citizens reliance is
weakened, though not inapplicable here. Regulations are issued
pursuant to power delegated to an agency by statute, but regulations
endorse a certain interpretation. The representation may still be
within the boundaries of the delegating statute-there's nothing in
Merrill to say that insuring reseeded wheat was against the initial
statute, and in fact, there are indications it was not. The concern about
the abuse of power does not apply in exactly the same way either.
Here, the concern is that government will use representations to
undermine their own regulations -to avoid applying them without
abolishing them. This is problematic on a number of levels, and will
be analyzed separately in the next section, but for the moment, suffice
it to say that there is also a problem with allowing agencies to
externalize the costs of their employees negligently, or worse,
intentionally, misrepresenting the agency's own regulations in a way
that causes damages to citizens.
In other cases the violation that adhering to the agency's
representation will lead to is not of regulations. In Heckler,43 the
specific question was whether salaries of certain employees were
reimbursable under Medicare. This depended on the interpretation
of a user manual created by the Department of Health and Human
Services, an interpretation the advising body should have referred to
HHS for but did not. In other words, this was not a situation where
the decision to reimburse was clearly in contrast to a congressional
statute, or even to agency regulations; it was a matter of how to
interpret the regulations.
Quite a few of the English cases addressing legitimate
expectations deal with situations where the agency made a
representation that it will interpret the statute in one way, and then
went back on that representation. For example, in HTV v. Price
Commission, the court decided that a public authority which led
traders to rely on one interpretation of a statutory provision could
only adopt another interpretation if there was "an overriding public
142. Mass. Const. art XXX
143. Heckler, 467 U.S at 60.
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interest" in doing so.'" Similar rulings were made in relation to
taxation, where the courts found that it was an abuse of power to go
back on a precise and unqualified representation. 145
Not only does the issue of reliance come up in many situations
where the issue is agency interpretation of statute or regulations, it
may easily come up when the agency is exercising its discretion. A
classic situation is an enforcement scenario: when it comes to
enforcement, agencies have substantial discretion when to enforce
and when not to enforce legislation and regulations. 146 If an agency
promises it won't enforce the regulation in a certain situation and
then changes its mind, a citizen may be harmed. Or if the agency
makes a decision that changes an interpretation a citizen relied on,
that citizen may suffer. For example, in Hoctor v. United States
Department of Agriculture,147 Mr. Hoctor, who raised big cats, was told
by a veterinarian of the USDA who inspected his property that to be
licensed to raise those cats he would need a six-foot perimeter fence
around all his property. Mr. Hoctor did so -and a year later, the
Department, in a manual provision, told inspectors to require an
eight-foot fence for dangerous animals. In 1990, seven years later,
Hoctor was cited and sanctioned for the fence not being the proper
height. 48 The issue here was not a direct violation of a statute; it was
a change in interpretation.
In the Coughlan case,149 the applicant was a gravely disabled
patient who agreed to be transferred from the hospital where she
received treatment to a National Health Service facility relying on a
promise that the institution would serve as their "home for life." Later
the authorities decided to close the institution. The decision was not
illegal - it was clearly within the authorities' discretion, but in
violation of the representation given to petitioner, and when
petitioner claimed she would not have agreed to the transfer without
a promise of permanent residence, the court protected her reliance.
144. HTV v. Price Commission [1976] ICR 170, 185. See also SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 109.
145. Id. at 110 n.21.
146. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 7.
147. Hoctor v. United State States Department of Agriculture, 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996).
148. Id. at 168.
149. R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, exp. Coughlan, [2000] 2 W.L.R. 262 (H.L).
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In another situation, 50 local authorities, mistakenly thinking they had
a duty to supply homeless refugees with permanent
accommodations, promised those refugees secure accommodations.
After the House of Lords decided there is no such obligation, the
question was whether the authorities' promise binds them to provide
such accommodation. Again, the promise was not in violation of a
statute.
In spite of the fact that citizen reliance on government advice
does not always - or even usually - involve direct violation of a
statute, the courts in the United States apply the same restrictive
standard in all cases.
2. The Realities of the Modern Administrative State
The reason that so many situations in which reliance needs to be
protected do not involve statutes is because agencies make so much
of the law which applies to individuals in the modern administrative
state.' 5' Statutes often provide agencies substantial room to fill in
details. And implementation carries with it substantial amounts of
discretion.152 As pointed out elsewhere, administrative agencies
combine legislative, executive and adjudicative powers.153 The
interaction for individual citizens or corporations is often between
them and the agency and includes the broader dance between the
agency, Congress, President and Courts (which is less relevant to the
specific reliance problem). It is the agency that is in charge of
implementing the statute to which the citizen will naturally direct
questions about implementation; and the agency on whose words she
will rely. Asking the agency for answers about the legislative scheme
they are implementing is the simple, logical and practical thing to do
for a citizen seeking to manage her affairs and comply with the law.
The Supreme Court based its estoppel jurisprudence in part on
150. R. (on the application ofBibi and Al-Nashed) v. Newham London BC [200211 W.L.R 237.
151. Smith & Licari, Public Administration, supra note 172.
152. Christopher J. Jewell & Bonnie E. Glaser, Toward a General Analytic Framework:
Organizational Settings, Policy Goals, and Street-Level Behavior, 38 ADMINISTRATION &
SOCIETY 335 (2006); MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 3- 4 (Russell Sage
Foundation 30th Anniversary Edition ed. 2010).
153. Charles H. Koch, Policy Making by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 AL. L. REV.
693 (2005). See also Lawson, supra note 183 (viewing the administrative state as
unconstitutional for exactly that reason).
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the presumption that the citizen knows the law. 5 4 Yes, the citizen is
constructively presumed to know the law, but in the administrative
state there are pages on pages of legislation and secondary
legislation.155 Who is it more realistic to expect will know the
regulations applying to a particular agency-the agency's staff that
works with the material day in and day out, or the citizen who has to
interact with multiple agencies each day?156 And if the agency tells
the citizen that its regulation says X - as in Merrill - there is at least a
case for protecting a citizen who assumes the agency knows the
regulations governing it and relies on its word.
3. Other Values
Even if we accept the importance of separation of powers, it is
not clear that in every case separation of powers and legality should
trump over the countervailing values. There are very few instances
in which our system provides absolute protection to any value,
regardless of what is on the other side. Freedom of speech is limited
in certain important cases.157 Parental rights and freedom of religion
have been limited in certain cases.158
Why would separation of powers be dominant in this case? I will
elaborate on the values protected here in subsection II.B., but in short,
they include fairness to the citizen, protecting citizen autonomy and
promoting government legitimacy and effective administration. The
financial hardship to the citizen was mentioned in several of the cases
(though it is my impression it was underestimated); but the potential
injury to citizen autonomy and the effect on trust in government were
154. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 64 (saying "This is consistent with the general rule that
those who deal with the government are expected to know the law and may not rely
on the conduct of government agents contrary to law.").
155. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking Process - For
Better or Worse, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 469 (2008) (regarding the growth in volume of the
federal register). See also CLYDE WAYNE JR. CREwS, TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN
ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE (Competitive Enterprise Institute
2008) (regarding the growth in the number of rules).
156. KENNETH J. MEIER, POLITIcs AND THE BUREAUCRACY: POLICYMAKING IN THE
FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 62-3 (Harcourt College Publishers 4th ed.)(2000).
157. Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American
Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 917-20 (2009).
158. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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not. And they should be considered as part of the picture.
4. Other Remedies
In the most extreme case, the only way to directly enforce the
representation relied upon is for the agency to be allowed or ordered
to ignore a statutory command. As explained, that raises very real
concerns of democratic legitimacy and potential abuse of power by
agencies. But the same concerns do not come up if, instead of
enforcement, the remedy is providing reliance damages -monetary
damages -to the injured citizen.159 To protect both citizen reliance
and the principle of legality, the courts could refuse direct
enforcement-but then compensate the relying citizen for damages
directly resulting from the reliance (upon proof of certain elements).
This proposal will be developed in section IV.
B. Protecting Individual Autonomy and Government Legitimacy
For a variety of reasons, protecting the individual's reliance on
government representation is important. From the point of view of
the individual, they need to be able to plan ahead and foresee the
results of their actions, in order to be able to act autonomously and to
make choices about their lives. Knowing the legal framework in
which they operate-having some degree of legal certainty-is
important for such autonomy. 160 Without the ability to rely on official
representations, such certainty decreases dramatically. 161 Given the
vast discretion that administrative agencies possess, 162 anticipating
an agency's action is very hard without any input from them; and not
being able to rely on representations negates the value of such
input.163
Not only that, but administrative authorities have reasons to
159. Daphne Barak-Erez, Protecting Reliance in Administrative Law, 27 MISHPATIM
17 (1996) [hereinafter Daphne Barak-Erez]
160. Id. at 164. That, after all, is one of the reasons for the principle of legality in
criminal law.
161. Id. at 12-13.
162. Barkow, HARv. L. REV., 1333-1335 (2008); Bryner, supra note 173; MARTIN
SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (The Free Press 1964);
Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can't Figure Out
About Controlling Administrative Power, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. (2008).
163. Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 13.
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want citizens to rely on their representations and to turn to them for
advice. To assure the smooth running of their functions, agencies
want the citizens and regulatees to follow their requirements. If it's a
matter of enforcement, even if the agency has all the resources it
wants-and most agencies today do not' 64-it probably has other
things it wants to dedicate resources to, besides enforcement. If it's
just a matter of managing its work, things run more smoothly if the
requirements are clear. The best source for understanding a complex
administrative scheme with substantial ambiguities is asking the
agency in charge of enforcing it.165 If the citizen cannot rely on what
the government is saying not only will the citizen have substantial
costs in figuring out what the requirements are,166 which will reduce
the social utility of the regulatory scheme without any real benefits,
there will also be delays in implementation. If the issue is one where
the government is regulating the market in some way, not protecting
expectations will undermine the ability of government to credibly
commit in ways that will allow businesses to act with confidence -
people or businesses will hesitate to rely in future.167 Of course, in
areas where the government is the "only game in town"-e.g.
pollution permits -people will have no choice. However, if there is
substantial uncertainty in those areas, investors may not invest in
technologies that require access to an unreliable government-or
they may invest less.
A less utilitarian argument starts from the premise that the
modern state exists for its citizens. Government "by the people, for
the people"168 suggests that government agencies should serve
citizens, not cheat or negligently mislead them.169 To push the
argument further, the principle of legality aims not at reducing the
rights of a citizen, but at protecting them, by reducing the ability of
164. Paul Pierson, From Expansion to Austerity: The New Politics of Taxing and Spending,
in SEEKING THE CENTER: PoLmcs AND POLICYMAKING AT THE NEw CENTURY (Martin A.,
Landy Levin, Marc. K., Shapiro, Martin M. ed. 2001); Richard J. Jr Pierce, Judicial Review of
Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 645 (1997).
165. Bendor, supra note 123, at 26.
166. Id.; Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 29.
167. Id. at 20, 31-32.
168. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19 1863).
169. Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 29.
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government to deviate from the law and abuse its powers.170 Using
this principle to prevent a citizen from holding government to its
representation goes against its fundamental goals.
From the point of view of the public administration, allowing
government to go back on a representation it made would undermine
trust in government and government's legitimacy. If the government
breaks its word - and furthermore, the courts allow it to break its
word -how can what it says be trusted?171 Holding government to
its representation, on the other hand, should help control public
authorities - if they know they will be held to their representations,
they will be more careful in making them, and hopefully, those
representations will better reflect actual law and policy.172
C. Dangers to Administrative Integrity: The Risk of Collusion and
Abuse
One of the concerns raised by the Court is the danger of collusion
and abuse.173 The idea is that a regulator, wishing to go beyond its
mandate, or to deviate from the rules binding it, will intentionally
misrepresent the law - with or without the cooperation of the relying
party - and if the law will protect third party reliance, the representing
party will thus be bound to its illegal misrepresentation. 174 This could
allow agencies to avoid congressional requirements - generally, or in
specific cases where the regulator is particularly close to or
sympathetic to the regulated industry. A concern of a similar vein is
that accepting estoppel will allow low-level officials in the agency to
avoid the instructions of the center, undermining hierarchical
control.175
It is possible for an agency member to collude with a private
party to avoid congressional law or the instructions of the agency's
center. In one example,17 6 Charalambe Boutris, an inspector for the
170. Bendor, supra note 123, at 26; Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 153.
171. Id. at 25.
172. Id. at 35.
173. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 65-66.
174. Bendor, supra Note 123, chapter 4, pp. 62-64.
175. Magill, supra note 147, at 859.
176. Russell W. Mills, The Promise of Collaborative Voluntary Partnerships:
Lessons from the Federal Aviation Administration, IBM Center for The Business of
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FAA at the Southwest Airlines (SWA) office, was responsible for the
airframe and systems of the airline's fleet of Boeing 737 jets. As early
as 2003, Boutris found that SWA records of airworthiness directives
did not meet the requirements of the law. He informed the SWA
maintenance officials and recommended to his Supervisory Principal
Maintenance Inspector, his superior, Douglas Gawadzinski that they
file a letter of investigation against SWA. Gawadzinski refused and
instead offered to conduct a safety attributed investigation to see if
the airline was in compliance with federal regulations: which
Gawadzinski eventually approved a year later. On March 15, 2007,
SWA informed Gawadzinski that 47 of their aircraft had over-flown
the required fuselage fatigue inspection and on March 19, 2007, SWA
filed a voluntary disclosure claim with the FAA. Shortly afterwards
Boutris learned that the affected aircraft were still flying in passenger
operations until March 23, 2007 and that six of these aircraft had
cracks up to four-inches in the fuselage (USHTI Hearing 4/3/2008).
On the VDRP application, Gawadzinski had falsely confirmed that
SWA had ceased operations of the planes after they discovered the
crack in the fuselage, while in reality they allowed the 47 aircraft to
continue in service for up to 30 months after they were due to be
inspected. This was a direct violation of the regulation. While direct
collusion appears to be less common than problems with compliance
which result from agency members having too much trust in the
regulated industry;177 such collusion does happen on occasion.
However, relying on estoppel to get around a regulation seems
a very problematic, roundabout way to achieve the goal. Let's
distinguish between two scenarios: seeking noncompliance with the
rule and seeking to benefit a specific private party. If the end sought
is avoiding the rule, we have a situation where the agency dislikes the
Government Report, Sept. 2010, at 8
177. P. GRABOSKY & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, OF MANNERS GENTLE: ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGIES OF AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REGULATORY AGENCIES 197-98(Oxford
University Press 1986); James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in
PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW TO LIMIT
IT 455 (Daniel P. Carpenter & David Moss eds., Forthcoming); T. Makkai & John
Braithewaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture, 12
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY 61(1992); JAMES S. TURNER & RALPH NADER, THE CHEMICAL
FEAST: THE RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON FOOD PROTECTION AND THE FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Penguin 1970).
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congressional statute or the local office dislikes the command of the
center, and the end goal is completely avoiding it. In that case,
estoppel, which is a case specific remedy, does not seem to achieve
that goal. It is true that agencies may be found arbitrary and
capricious 178 if they deviate from their own previous decisions
without an explanation. 179 Although that is the standard, previous
decisions of an agency previous decisions are not considered
precedent under any strict interpretation of the term and an agency
may deviate from a previous decision if there is good reason to do
so, 180 like, for example, if the previous decision was based on error. If
an agency makes an argument in court that it is bound to adhere to a
previous misrepresentation, that argument would be unconvincing.
One concern here is that when an agency uses a representation that a
party relied on, it is unclear who would be in position to complain -
in terms of knowledge or in terms of standing. If the representation
worked for a certain party, that party won't complain, and you would
need an external actor with enough interest in the matter to watch out
for it and take steps. So in some cases an agency may consistently
deviate from a mandate. It does not seem, however, that this scenario
raises a real threat of widespread deviation from congressional
requirements or agency regulations.
If a local office is deviating from the center's desire, once the
center discovers the deviation, it can be fixed, creating a possible
remedy for collusion. Alaska Professional Hunters creates an obstacle
to this, since in that case, the FAA's central office was held by the D.C.
Circuit to the regional office's interpretation; 81 though even there,
there was no indication of intentional rebellion of the regional office
against the center, rather, an error of interpretation seemed to be at
issue. At any rate, later cases dramatically cut into Alaska Professional
Hunter's holding182 and it has never been embraced by the Supreme
Court or by another circuit. The reasons seem to be twofold: it gives
substantial weight to non-legislative rules, in a way that seems to
178. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2013).
179. Davila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994).
180. Id.
181. Alaska Professional Hunters Association Inc. v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1032
(Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
182. E.G. Metwest Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 560 F.3d 506, 509-12 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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contradict the APA; and it undermines the control of the agency's
central (chief) office over its local offices.
In the other scenario, an agency colludes with a private entity by
making an official representation that the entity can rely on. Estoppel
will be relevant in cases where the agency's decision, if not the
collusion itself, is detected and the agency is forced -because of
external pressures - to go back on its word. Or when a regional
office's promise is overturned by a central office, because if the
agency's decision is not known, the other party will get what it wants
and no one will be the wiser - and there will be no question of
estoppel. If collusion can be shown, as in the case of Southwest above,
a reliance claim will probably be rejected. There is no unfairness to a
private party in reversing a benefit it only got through underhanded
means. 8 3 So the question is, should we refrain from protecting
reliance in order to avoid the cases in which the agency was acting in
a problematic way, but the private party was not involved, or if
collusion cannot be shown. We do not know how common such cases
are; and blanket denial of protection to citizens without evidence of
collusion because there may be undetected collusion in some cases
seems very problematic. Before going there, I would like evidence
that collusion does, indeed, happen in a substantial portion of cases.
D. Social Utility and Cost Allocation
The Court emphasized the risk to the public fisc. While I pointed
out that in Richmond the amount in question was low, and that
estoppel probably does not have precedential value, in other cases the
amount can be more substantial. In Heckler, the Court said:
Protection of the public fisc requires that those who seek public
funds act with scrupulous regard for the requirements of law;
respondent could expect no less than to be held to the most
demanding standards in its quest for public funds. 84
In that case, the amount in question was $71,480,185 which is
183. Just as when immigration finds a marriage fraudulent it can revoke a
Greencard. Marcel De Armas, For Richer or Poorer or Any Other Reason: Adjudicating
Immigration Marriage Fraud Cases within the Scope of the Constitution, 15 AM. U. J. OF
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 743 (2006-2007).
184. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 63.
185. Id. at 57.
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substantial. The potential harm to the public purse if the government
has to pay for it is one consideration for limiting the remedy, but
should not be the end of the discussion. There are also costs to not
having the government pay for it. From a social utility point of view,
one cost is that refusing to protect reliance will lead to individuals
incurring expenses as part of reliance, which ends up being wasted,
and social waste is never a benefit.18 6 Not only is this a waste, but it
is unfair to make the party investing in reliance bear those costs. The
costs are there, and someone has to pay. If the government made an
error, placing the costs of that error on one party-the relying
individual -is unfair. In a real sense, allowing agencies to go back on
their representation means externalizing the costs of mistakes: the
government made the mistake, but the recipient citizen will have to
pay for it.187 A strong argument can be made that the costs of
government errors should be internalized by the government. From
a point of view of fairness, again, requiring the government, and not
the relying citizen, to pay for such errors would spread the cost
among the general public, by forcing the government to either keep
to its representation or pay damages out of the public purse.188
In line with these tort-style arguments, the counter argument to
the idea that government will collude with citizens in circumventing
the law is that protecting reliance will deter negligent
misrepresentations and lead the government to be more careful in its
advice, since it can be forced to pay for its mistake.189 One can argue
that there are other controls in place to prevent agencies from
misrepresentations, be they negligent or otherwise, which includes
the risk of judicial review, something no sane public official wants,
and of bad publicity. 190 It's unclear, however, how powerful these
other controls are in a system where the courts have a clear approach
186. Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 20.
187. Id.
188. Bendor, supra note 123, at 2727; Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 27; Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
189. Barak-Erez, supra note 160.
190. Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a "Dense Complexity": Accountability and the
Project of Administrative Law, 2005 Issues In Legal Scholarship, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law (2005). Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Tailored Participation:
Modernizing the APA Rulemaking Procedures 12 NYU J. LEG. PUB. POL'Y 321, 350-
370 (2009).
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of not protecting reliance, 191 and where many of the cases involve
small, individual stories, which may not get the attention of the press.
E. Other Issues
Besides the principle of legality, a number of other arguments go
against protecting reliance. One concern is that protecting one party
can harm others. If we consider the second example I provided -
giving a permit to a plant to pollute -protecting the plant's reliance,
if done through direct enforcement, can harm the environment and
the health of those that rely on the water. 92 Similarly, giving a license
or benefit to one party, based on a representation, can harm another
party that did not get that license. This can happen if the regulation
is in place to overcome a market failure, for example, a regulation to
prevent the harm from a monopoly. 93 In a case like this, the parties
involved are not just the regulator and the regulated industry, but
also the third parties for whose protection the regulation was created.
Allowing the regulator to respect the regulated industry's reliance
may harm those parties. But since this will not always be the case, it
seems problematic to have a general rule limiting estoppel just
because of that. Effects on a third party are one of the things to
consider, but do not justify the almost absolute position the court
currently takes.
Another possible concern is the equal treatment of similar cases.
If other parties are denied the benefit in the name of the law, it is
unfair to grant it only to one party. But equality means treating like
cases alike, while treating different cases differently. The party
towards which the government gave a misrepresentation, who then
191. Though even in the United States, in the lower courts, arguments of estoppel
were sometimes accepted, so the risk exists, and may be enough. See Klein v.
Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 224 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Wharton,
514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 421 F.2d 92, 103
(9th Cir. 1970) (holding that estoppel could be applied against the government,
because " ... the dictates of both morals and justice indicate that the government is
not entitled to immunity from equitable estoppel in this case."); United States v. Lazy
FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973); Schuster v. Comm'r, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.
1962); United States v. Big Bend Transit Co., 42 F. Supp. 459 (E.d. Wash. N.d. 1942);
Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
192. Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 30.
193. Bendor, supra note 123, at 6.
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relied on it, is not situated similarly to all other claimants. That party
relied on a misrepresentation so the harm to it is worse than the harm
to a similarly situated party without such reliance.
F. Conclusion
The discussion above strongly suggests that the balance of
considerations probably support some protection of reliance, though
the force of the counter arguments suggests that the protection should
be on a case by case basis, and not absolute.
III. Reliance in Comparison: How Do Other Systems
Balance These Considerations?
The starting point of this discussion is that there is a common
core between the three systems to which I am comparing the United
States to. In the U.K., France, and Israel there is a strong emphasis on
the principle of legality: an authority cannot act outside its legal
authority. The principle of reliance is only acknowledged to a limited
extent if it directly clashes with legality -though each system offers
at least some potential protection. All three systems, however,
protect reliance to some degree when the issue is not blatant illegality
and may offer a monetary remedy. What seems to be happening is
that the systems are trying to find a practical solution to the relying
citizen's problem without sacrificing the principle of legality.
A. Britain
After some thought, the British House of Lords-now the
Supreme Court 194- decided that estoppel does not usually apply to
public authorities. 9 5 But although estoppel itself is not used, there is
substantial protection of reliance on lawful representations, a
protection that increased over the first decade of the twenty-first
century.
The legal tool used by English law in these circumstances is the
doctrine of "protection of legitimate expectations.1 96 Under this
194. Constitutional Reform Act, (2005) ch. 4, c.4.
195. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120; R. (Reprotech
(Pebsham) Ltd.) v. East Sussex CC [2002] UKHL 8, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 248.
196. Daphne Barak-Erez, The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations and the Distinction
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doctrine, in certain circumstances, expectations generated due to an
individual's reliance on a representation of the administration will be
protected.197 The courts have struggled with several questions: when
will such reliance be protected; should the courts protect only
procedural reliance, or also substantive reliance; what should be the
effect of legitimate expectations on the administrative decision; and
by what yardstick should the administration's behavior be measured.
In Rowland,198 the court summarized the doctrine of legitimate
expectations as follows:
By a representation (a term which embraces a regular practice and
a course of dealing) a public body does not give rise to an estoppel
but may create an expectation in another ("the citizen") from which
it would be an abuse of power to resile: R v East Sussex County
Council ex parte Reprotech Pebsham Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 58. The
principle of good administration prima facie requires adherence by
public authorities to their promises. Whether it does so require
must be determined in the light of all the circumstances. The public
body can only be bound by acts and statements of its employees
and agents if and to the extent that they had actual or ostensible
authority to bind the public body by their acts and
statements: South Bucks District Council v Flanagan [2002] 1 WLR
2601 at 2607 para 18 per Keene LJ. False The expectation may be
between the Reliance and Expectation Interests, 11 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 583 (2005);
HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1083-92 (T&F Books
8th ed. 2010) [hereinafter BARNETT];, Legitimate Expectations, supra note 120. The
court in Reprotech found an "analogy" between the doctrine of legitimate expectation
and the doctrine of estoppel, but said that "There is of course an analogy between a
private law estoppel and the public law concept of a legitimate expectation created
by a public authority, the denial of which may amount to an abuse of power: see
[Coughlan]. But it is no more than an analogy because remedies against public
authorities also have to take into account the interests of the general public that the
authority exists to promote. Public law rights can also take into account the hierarchy
of individual rights which exist under the Human Rights Act of 1998, so that, for
example, the individual's right to a home is accorded a high degree of protection
(See Coughlan's case, at 254-55) while ordinary property rights are in general far
more limited by considerations of public interest" [Id. at para. 34].
197. Barnett, supra note 243; Daphne Barak-Erez, infra note 243, at 599-600.
(arguing that although the cases themselves do not use the term, courts tend to offer
more protection when the individual relied on an administrative representation to
her detriment than when expectations were disappointed but there was no reliance).
198. Rowland v. Environment Agency [2003] EWCA Civ 1885, THE TIMES, Jan. 20,
2004, 67-68.
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substantive or procedural and the categories of legitimate
expectation are not closed... Once the claimant has established the
legitimate expectation, he must show that it would be unfair of the
public body to resile from giving effect to the legitimate
expectation.... The court must also consider whether and how far
(going beyond the immediate parties) the wider interests of the
public may be affected by giving effect to the expectation, for the
wider interests may require that the public body resiles in order
properly to protect those wider interests.... At the end of the day
the court must decide whether having regard to all the relevant
circumstances including the reliance by the citizen, the impact on
the interests of the citizen and the public and considerations of
proportionality for the public body to resile would in all the
circumstances and applying the criteria referred to be so unfair as
to constitute an abuse of power.
In other words, the court will protect reliance on a case-by-case
basis, reconciling the different interests involved. A recent case,
Bancoult, demonstrates how those principles can be applied.199 A 1971
immigration ordinance compulsorily removed the Chagossian
inhabitants of islands in the British Indian Ocean Territory so that the
main island could be used as a United States military base. The
respondent had been successful in an earlier application for judicial
review of this ordinance. The government of the United Kingdom
stated that it accepted the court's ruling and would not appeal.
However, later the government decided that resettlement of the
islands was not feasible and that the territory was still wanted for
defense purposes. Her Majesty exercised her prerogative to make
two Orders in Council to prevent the Chagossians from returning to
the islands.
On the issue of legitimate expectation, the House of Lords
reiterated the principle that the basis of actionable claims of legitimate
expectation is "abuse of power and unfairness to the citizen on the
part of a public authority." 200 The House found that there is no abuse
of power because the government's statement did not meet the
standard of "a clear and unambiguous promise." 201 Taking into
199. R. (on the application of Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61.
200. Id. at 135.
201. Id.
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account the context of the statement, there was an ongoing study "on
the feasibility of resettling the Ilois" and there was no promise as to
how long it would be specifically until the Ilois would be returned to
the outer islands. Alternatively, even if a different construction of
that statement could be made, the House found sufficient public
interest justification for not resettling the Chagossians -the danger
and the prohibitive cost of resettlement.
Traditionally, legitimate expectations cannot be created by an
unlawful representation or promise.2 2  Several prominent
administrative law scholars criticized this as overly harsh.2 3 Two
recent decisions suggest a possible rethinking of this principle. First,
in Stretch,204 a claimant purchased a lease from a local authority that
obliged him to build a commercial building and gave him the rights
to it for 22 years. The lease included an option to renew for 21 years.
When it was time to renew the local authority told the claimant that
he could not exercise the option because (among other things) its
predecessor did not have the legal capacity to grant the option. The
court of appeals grudgingly accepted this, stating it was unfair to
allow public bodies to use their own error to get out of unlawful
bargains they made.205 The claimant appealed to the European Court
of Human Rights, which said that the applicant acquired a legitimate
expectation of exercising that option 2° 6, which can be seen as a
202. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 166, at 146-47.
203. PAUL CRAIG, ADmrNsnRATIVE LAw 675-80 (Sweet & Maxwell 2003); WILLAM
WADE & CHRISroPHER FoRsYrH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 343 (Oxford University Press. 2004).
204. Stretch v. UK (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 12.
205. Stretch v. West Dorset District Council, [1999] 77 P.P. & C.R. 342: "... I would
dismiss this appeal. I do so with little satisfaction. It seems to me unjust that when
public bodies misconstrue their own powers to enter into commercial transactions
with unsuspecting members of the public, those bodies should be allowed to take
advantage of their own errors to escape from the unlawful bargains which they have
made. For a local authority to assert the illegality of its own action is an unattractive
stance for it to adopt. It is the more striking when, as in this case, the transaction in
question is as mundane as a building lease; and the local authority, by taking the
point against the member of the public with whom it or its predecessor contracted,
thereby robs that member of the public of part of the consideration for entering into
the lease."). and see also Mark Elliott, Legitimate Expectations and Unlawful
Representations, 63 C.L.J. 261(2004).
206. "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
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property right under Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention
of Human Rights.20 7
In a subsequent case, the court considered how Stretch affects
domestic English Law.208 In 1968 Mr. and Mrs. Rowlands bought a
country house bordering a stretch of the River Thames, Hedsor
Water. Public rights of navigation exist over the River Thames "from
times immemorial." 20 9 However, for over 100 years the authorities
treated Hedsor Water as private, creating barriers to entries and
putting signs that it was private. In 2001, the Environmental Agency
reviewed its position and decided that Hedsor Water was still public,
and that the agency had no authority to make it private. However, in
consideration of the Rowlands' rights it promised not to publish or
put up notices stating that Hedsor Water was a public body of water.
Mrs. Rowland, now a widow, appealed, claiming her legitimate
expectations were frustrated. The court concluded that under
domestic law, it could not uphold a legitimate expectation based on
an unlawful promise, although with substantial reluctance from at
least one of the justices, Justice May. 210
However, Lord Justice Gibson also addressed the effect of Stretch
and the convention, and concluded that under the European
Convention of Human Rights, a legitimate expectation can arise, even
if the public body that created the expectation acted ultra vires. The
doctrine cannot entitle the party to enforcement of something that is
ultra vires but entitles it to other relief- "benevolent exercise of a
discretion available to alleviate the injustice or payment of
compensation."21 ' Illegality will affect the balancing of the
expectation with the private right; though it may, in some
circumstances, support non-enforcement. 212 In applying these
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or
other contributions or penalties."
207. Stretch v. UK (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 12. Para. 32-35.
208. Rowland v. Environment Agency [20031 EWCA Civ 1885, TlE TIMES, Jan. 20,2004.
209. Id. at para. 3.
210. See id, L.J. Gibson, para. 81; L.J. May, para. 114-122.
211. Id. at para. 85-90.
212. Id.
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principles to the specific facts of the case, L.J. Gibson concluded the
agency here acted proportionally and minimized the harm to the
private interests and that the public interest was too strong to put
aside.213 What this suggests is that in cases where the behavior of the
agency affects property, under the European Convention of Human
Rights, even unlawful representations which create legitimate
expectations must be considered. In the face of anything less than
clear illegality, the doctrine of legitimate expectations, as described
above, can protect a citizen's reliance.
On the other hand, courts generally do not see damages as an
appropriate response to unlawful decisions, and tort liability has
been substantially narrowed. Unlawfulness does not in itself create a
right to damages and another tort must be acknowledged. Possible
torts are usually breach of statutory duty, negligence, and
misfeasance in public office -and all three are hard to prove in this
context.214 All three are limited in terms of who can sue and which
kind of damages can be granted, usually property damages and
personal injury are covered, but not economic loss and lost profits -
very relevant to cases of revoked licenses or welfare benefits.215
The reasons for limiting liability are usually that courts are
worried liability will have a chilling effect on officials, leading to a
flood of litigation, that the courts are not able to properly evaluate the
hard administrative decisions, and that allowing damages for
economic loss will make liability potentially limitless and strain
public resources and that damages will erode more appropriate
administrative remedies.216
In relation to misrepresentations specifically, negligence liability
was narrowly established in the classic case of Hedley Bryne v.
Heller.217 The case established that anyone who makes an incorrect
statement of fact, law, or intent is liable for damage- including pure
213. Id, at para. 96.
214. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 182-92.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 183.
217. Hedley Bryne v Heller [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.). Reconfirmed in Williams v.
Natural Life Health Food Ltd [1998] 1 WLR (H.L.) 30; see also, SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 218-219.
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economic loss -of a recipient of that statement if :218
a. Representor willfully assumed responsibility for its
correctness, according to the court's objective assessment
(subjective state of mind not determinative).
b. Recipient acted in reasonable reliance.
c. Representor knew the statement would be communicated
to and acted upon, by the recipient for a specific purpose.
Why the representor made an error is irrelevant.
Public authorities are subject to the principle, but it is limited to
special situations because the cases applying Hedley Bryne are
influenced by the policy considerations which led to restriction of
negligent liability here; the courts are reluctant to impose liability
since they are worried it will adversely affect the exercise of public
powers, cause a flood of claims, and erode alternative remedies.219
Can this be applied to the United States? Aside from the usual
concerns about learning from another country, the U.K. has a
parliamentary system, so separation of powers operates differently.
The U.K. is a unitary country, and is more centralized than the United
States. However, as explained in section II, the strongest reason raised
by the Supreme Court for denying estoppel is the concern about
allowing executive officials to deviate from commands of the
legislature or allowing those officials scope to abuse their power.
Those considerations are raised and addressed by the legitimate
expectations of jurisprudence directly.
B. Israel
Israel offers limited protection of reliance on government
representations using several tools. First, Israeli law directly protects
reliance on an administrative promise in certain narrow
circumstances and uses an acknowledged doctrine of estoppel in
others. Second, Israeli law acknowledges a tort remedy for
misrepresentation. Third, through the doctrine of "proportional
invalidation," it allows defective, or faulty, administrative decisions
to stand in certain cases by acknowledging the problem but setting a
different remedy than invalidation.
218. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120 at 218.
219. Id. at 219.
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Israeli law acknowledges an "administrative promise" that binds
the agency in certain, narrow circumstances. If an administrative
agency made a promise on a matter within its legal authority, with
the intent to give it binding legal force, and the agency has the power
to fulfill the promise, the agency is bound by the promise-unless
there is a legal justification to retreat from it.220 The requirements of
this doctrine are narrowly construed and closely scrutinized,22 1 and
even if the first three conditions are fulfilled, an authority can still
retract its promise if there is a good justification-for example, a
deviation from general policy or a violation of the principle of
equality.222 This suggests very limited protection of reliance, but is
not the whole picture.
The protection of reliance on a decision that is outside the
agency's authority is even more limited. The vehicle used here is
estoppel, and estoppel against the government has rarely been
acknowledged in Israeli law.223 After many years of denying it
completely, the Supreme Court acknowledged estoppel in principle
in 1999. The Court addressed whether the Israeli Land
Administration could retreat from an agreement to provide lands
without tender to a plaintiff in certain conditions.224 The presiding
Justice in the case acknowledged estoppel in narrow circumstances
and created a balancing test. He balanced the public interest and the
gravity of the harm to the public interest from enforcing an illegal
decision with the harm to the individual from overturning the
220. Alex Stein, Administrative Promise, 14 MISHPATIM 255, 258-265 (1984-1985);
Case no. 135/75 Sai-Tex v. Minister of Commerce and Industry, P.D. 30 673, 676;
594/78 Oman Knitting v. Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, P.D. 32 (3)
469, 474 (1978); 142/86 Dishon v. Minister of Agriculture, P.D. 40 (4) 523, 529. These
requirements were reaffirmed in 714/06 Major Amir Ziv v. IDF (Not published,
decision on December 30, 2007).
221. See Yoav Dotan, An Administrative Promise to the Public, 5 MISHPAT UMUMSHAL
(Law and Government) (2000) 117-63 (Hebrew) (demonstrating that the cases in
which the Israeli Supreme Court accepted a claim of administrative promise have
been very few).
222. Id. at 491; see also Id. at 492 (criticizing that approach).
223. Barak-Erez, supra note 106, at 153-55.
224. 6996/97 Aba'ada Ltd. v. The Planning and Development Department, Israeli
Land Administration, 53(4) PD 117, 123-124 [1999] (Isr.).
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decision.225 The Justice also decreed that if the harm to the public
interest was too high, then an alternative remedy to enforcement
should be considered -either an alternative remedy close to the
initial representation or monetary damages.226 In that specific case
the Justice believed that given the importance of awarding public
lands only through tender, the public harm from enforcing the
administrative representation- that lands would be awarded
without tender-was too high, and therefore remanded to a lower
court for the consideration of an alternative remedy.227 This grudging
acceptance of estoppel was repeated in a later case, 28 though that case
highlighted the hesitation of using administrative estoppel.229
Israeli law potentially provides stronger remedies. First, Israel
allows tort damages for negligent misrepresentation by public
officials.230 This liability was used in the zoning and construction
field in cases involving faulty permits or faulty promises.2 31 In fact,
Daphne Barak-Erez, a Supreme Court Justice and a prominent
scholar, strongly advocates damages as the preferable remedy,
compared to an injunction, in most circumstances:
225. Id. 124. See also Barak-Erez, supra note 160, footnote 209, at 155.
226. Id. at 125.
227. Id. at 125.
228. 9634/08 Hof Hasharon Regional Council v. Minister of Interior, Dinim Elyon
87 192[2009] (Isr.). In that case a local authority wanted to appoint a salaried vice-
chair. The law requires a municipality to have a minimum of 10,000 inhabitants, and
the official census did not reflect that; the municipality claimed it did in fact have
more than 10000 people, and that it met with a Ministry of Interior official that
promised that one the census reflected 10,000 people, it can appoint a salaried vice-
chair. The municipality worked hard to correct the census, but it's request was
nonetheless denied due to a subsequent Supreme Court case. http://elyonl.court.
gov.il/files/08/340/096/b07/08096340.b07.pdf. The court rejected the municipality's
main claim, that the previous Supreme Court case was not relevant, and also rejected
its estoppel claim, concluding that in balance, the interest against enforcement of the
representation were stronger here.
229. Id.
230. Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 156 n.210.
231. 86/76 "Amidar", the National Corporation for Housing Immigrants in Israel
v. Avraham Aharon; 209/85 Kiryat Ata City Council v. Ilanko LTD. (acknowledging
the principle that an authority must pay damages for negligent misrepresentation,
but not applying there because of proof issues); 1540/97 Local Zoning and
Construction Committee, Holon v. Avraham Rubinstein and partners, Construction
company LTD, P.d. 57 (3) 374 (2003).
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reliance damages to the injured individual can correct the injustice
without enforcing an ultra vires decision. . . the monetary remedy
also corrects the injustice to the party in question without harming
third parties (who would suffer the externalities of enforcing an
illegal decision). Other advantages are internalization of the
damage by the agency, deterrence from negligent violations in
future, and spreading the harm (across all tax-payers). Another
important advantage is the ability to match damages to the extent
of the harm (since damages match the reliance, while enforcement
may provide higher benefits than just the reliance).232
Similarly, Israeli administrative law acknowledges a doctrine of
"relative voidness." 233 Under this doctrine, in appropriate cases
where justice demands it, an administrative action will not be void,
and may even have some validity. While in many of the early cases
the doctrine was applied against the citizen, to preserve actions done
without sufficient notice or hearings from being voided, often with
harsh results towards the citizen,234 that is not the only way it was
used. For example, in Beit Herkev, 235 the court used relative voidness
to assess the competing interests of a public body and a private firm
and arrive at a compromise solution.236 In the case, the City of
Jerusalem's behavior suggested to a company operating a parking
garage that it may deduct expenses from its rent, although the
municipality had no legal authority to do that.237 The court decided
that given the fault of both parties, the correct result is not to
completely invalidate the contract but to reduce the rent owed to the
city to make up for the deducted expenses. 238
The principle of relative voidness was criticized from both
232. Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 156; The circumstances where injunction will
be better is when the reliance is so great the damages will harm the public interest by
bankrupting the authority. Id. at 156-57 n. 214.
233. Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 29; Daphne Barak-Erez, Relative Voidness and
Judicial Discretion, 24 MIsHPATIM 519, 520- 21 (1995) [hereinafter Barak-Erez, Relative
Voidness]; Yoav Dotan, Instead of Relative Voidness, 23 MISHPATIM (HEBREW UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW) 587, 630- 33 (1993) (Hebrew) [hereinafter Dotan].
234. Barak-Erez, Relative Voidness at 24; See id. at 519, 529, 531-533 (1995).
235. 6705/04 Beit Herkev LTD v. the City of Jerusalem, available at: http://elyon
1.court.gov.il/files/04/ 050/067/c10/ 04067050.clO.htm. Last visited June 6, 2013.
236. Id. at 26-38.
237. Id. at 3-22
238. Id. at 77.
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directions - for being too formalistic and not allowing the court to do
justice,239 and for subjecting the authority of public agencies to
judicial discretion to an extensive degree and violating separation of
powers, e.g. by Barak-Erez. 240  More specifically, Barak-Erez
distinguishes between two meanings of relative voidness. The first
meaning is procedural: a claim of voidness of administrative action
can only be heard if made "by the right party, in the right case."241
This sounds a lot like estoppel: the action may be void, but the
voidness cannot be raised in certain circumstances. That, in Barak-
Erez' view, is relatively uncontroversial and not problematic. The
other meaning-the one Barak-Erez criticizes-is a discretionary
meaning: under this meaning, relative voidness gives the court
discretion to waive voidness- to uphold the administrative action -
if it thinks it is just to do so.242
C. France
French law distinguishes between representations and actual
decisions. France protects public reliance on actual decisions via the
principle of irrevocability of administrative decisions that create
rights (intangibilit6 des decisions cr~atrices de droits).243  The
principle is based upon the idea that some administrative decisions,
government contracts, or even laws create a "vested right" (droit
acquis) in the person seeking to act. A vested right can only be
revoked under certain circumstances, especially those with an aim to
uphold legal certainty and a legitimate public expectation.244 To
illustrate how a vested right operates, we can use the example of
citizenship. Citizenship can be granted when the birth occurs in
France and the parents are themselves born in France ("jus soli")245 or
239. Dotan, supra note 234, at 639.
240. Barak-Erez, Relative Voidness, supra note 234, at 519, 538-542.
241. Id. at 527-529, 537. (regarding the claim that this meaning is natural and not
problematic).
242. Id. at 531-542.
243. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 70.
244. Id. at 92.
245. See Du MinistLre des Affaires Etrang~res, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr
/fr/francais-a-l-etranger-1296/vos-droits-et-demarches/nationalite-francaise/.
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through a procedure of naturalization.246 The loss of the French
nationality can be voluntary (express declaration of the person
seeking to give up this vested right after obtaining another
nationality247) but this vested right can also be lost involuntarily by a
person who is not French by birth or by descent. There is a
revocation, or withdrawal, of nationality ("dch~ance de nationalit"')
when the person has committed certain types of violations as
terrorism or crime against the fundamental interests of the Nation.248
But the right can only be revoked if the person obtained the
nationality during the ten years before revocation 249 and the
withdrawal of nationality must happen within the 10 years after the
commission of the crime. All these conditions demonstrate how
difficult it is to revoke a vested right -even if there are strong public
considerations in support of such revocation.
Under French law, the revocability of government decisions rests-
heavily upon the government's assessment of whether the decision
created a vested right in the person seeking to act. There is no bright
line rule as to which types of decisions are "rights bearing" and which
types of decisions are not, but the distinction -and the type of right
she possesses - is obviously very important to the relying citizen.
Therefore, this is an area of substantial uncertainty.250 For example, a
decision that was the result of an agency's consent to waive a
requirement or not insist on return of money can still create a right.251
Similarly, in one case an agency exercised its discretion and issued a
permit for opening a factory. The Conseil d'etat decided that "malgr6
son caract~re purement gracieux," although this decision was
discretionary and the agency was not, in the circumstances, required
to make it, it did create vested rights.252
246. L'acte Createur De Droits, Notion Symptomatique do L'existentialisme
Juridique. Du Juge Administratif Francais (2003), http://alexandrecoque-avocat.fr
/la%20notion%20d'actes%20crE9ateurs.pdf.
247. Article 23, Code Civil (1993).
248. Article 25, Code Civil (1994).
249. Article 26, Code Civil (2013).
250. Id.
251. CE Sect., Oct. 24, 2001, Min. 6co., fin. et ind. c/ Poussin: Juris-Data n' 2001-
063245; Dr. adm. 2002, comm. 33, obs. C. M.
252. CE Sect., Mar. 3 1967, Min. constr. c/ St6 Behr Manning et St6 des abrasifs
Norton : Rec. CE 1967, p. 105 ; AJDA 1967, p. 348 et 528, obs. Liet-Veaux et concl.
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In addition, French law has an exception for unlawful
declaratory decisions. Where a specific result is required under clear
legal provisions, an agency decision deviating from that result is
revocable at any time.253 This is in contrast to constitutive decisions,
where the government has discretion.254 Even if the constitutive
decision was unlawful, French law allows for revocation if, and only
if, the initial government act/decision becomes subject to review
within the first two months of its entrance into the public sphere.255
That means in practice, the government cannot revoke a decision -
even if it is illegal -unless it did so within the first two months of
review.256 The rationale is that there needs to be a balance between
the principle of lawful government and the legitimate expectations of
the citizen.257 Concluding that the power to revoke is a reflection of
the power of an administrative judge to annul unlawful decisions, the
court analogized to judicial review, and applied the same time limit
allowed for seeking judicial review -in France, a very short time.258
Today the time limit for third parties starts at publication.259 In the
rare case that a decision has not completely been disclosed to the
public (following French procedures of notification and publication)
or to the beneficiary of a government act, revocation is allowed within
Fournier ; JCP G 1967, II, 15082, note Liet-Veaux.
253. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 95.
254. Dupuis , G., Droit administratif 500 (Paris: Sirey, 11th ed. 2009); see also,
SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 93-94.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 95.
257. Pcresse conclusions CE Sect., Oct. 24,1997, Laubier RFDA 1998, 528; See also,
SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 92.
258. Id. at 93;. Dupuis, G. Droit administratif500 (11th ed., 2009).
259. Code de Justice Administrative, Article R421-1 (2004): "Sauf en matire de
travaux publics, la juridiction ne peut tre saisie que par voie de recours form6 contre
une decision, et ce, dans les deux mois a partir de la notification ou de la publication
de la dcision attaqu~e.La publication, sous forme 6lectronique, au Journal officiel de
la R~publique franqaise fait courir le d~lai du recours ouvert aux tiers contre les
d~cisions individuelles ... 4 Emanant d'autorit~s administratives ind~pendantes ou
d'autorit~s publiques ind~pendantes dot~es de la personnalit6 morale." Article
R421-2 "Sauf disposition legislative ou r~glementaire contraire, le silence gard6
pendant plus de deux mois sur une rclamation par l'autoritC comptente vaut
dcision de rejet."
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four months of the date that the decision was made.260
While decisions create rights, informal representations do not.
Representations are "legally relevant facts" (faits juridiques) rather
than "legal acts" (actes administratifs), and thus are not subject to the
principle of irrevocability. The administration may, therefore, go
back on informal representations, though it may be required to
compensate for loss caused by reliance on such representations. 261
For example, in the Bouveret case,262 the applicant was offered a
position in a letter signed by the mayor of a French town, following a
job competition. When he resigned from his current position, the
mayor refused to confirm the appointment, and the Conseil d'Etat
decreed that the applicant cannot challenge the refusal -though the
local authority was liable in damages. 263 Applicants tried to draw on
the principle of legitimate expectations in several cases, but the
Conseil d'Etat rejected that attempt.264 The only exception to this is
that since European Community Law (EC Law) does acknowledge a
principle of legitimate expectation, in cases implementing provisions
of EC law - which are not uncommon - the French courts will apply
the principle.265
This principle is even more strongly stated in relation to
unlawful representations. Unlawful representations are not binding
and can neither give rise to an estoppel by representation nor a
legitimate expectation.266 This is true even if the administration made
a very precise and unqualified assurance. For example, in the case of
Socit6 des huileries de Chauny,267 the Minister of Finance gave a
written assurance to French oil traders that a price regulation would
260. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 7.
261. Id. at 114.
262. CE 18/10-57 Bouveret Rec 542; See also, SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 115.
263. Id.
264. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 115-16;; CE 5/3-99
Rouquette RFDA 1999, 370. This was also approved by the Conseil Constitutionel-
CC 30/12-96, no 96-385, Receuil CC 141.
265. CE 5/3-99 Rouquette RFDA 1999, 370.
266. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120 at 146-147.
267. CE 24/4-64 Socigtg des huileries de Chauny, Rec 249; see also, SCHONBERG,
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 147.
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remain in force. The Conseil d'Etat found that that assurance illegally
fettered the Minister's discretionary power to regulate prices, and
was thus unlawful - and the Minister could not be bound by it.
This is also true in European Community Law. For example, in
Pauvert,268 the applicant was offered a job as a chauffeur -in writing,
after an interview. But the vacancy notice specified that the job
required fifteen years of experience as a chauffeur -and while the
applicant did have fifteen years of experience - only ten of them were
as a chauffeur. This meant the Court of Auditors was not bound by
its job offer. This case may not close the matter for informal
representations, though, since the ECJ stated in its opinion that the
applicant had no legitimate expectation since he should have known
the length and nature of his work experience, and thus should have
known that he does not satisfy the legal criteria. 269 While this appears
to give no protection to individuals relying on informal
representations, and creates some risk for those relying on decisions,
the picture is incomplete, since individuals relying on both decisions
and representation are very likely to have a damages remedy
available.
Again, there is a distinction between decisions and informal
representations. In relation to decisions, unlawfulness is by
definition a service fault (faute de service) which can make the
administration liable in damages.270 Unlike the law in the United
States 271 or the U.K.,2 72 a duty of care by the administration to citizens
is assumed-it is the administration's duty to administer
competently. Two principles of French administrative law support a
damage remedy to the individual. First, under the principle of
liability of risk (theorie de risqu6),273 if a risk is caused by a dangerous
activity the administration is engaged in for the public interest, and
causes abnormal harm to certain individuals, the loss should be
shouldered by society (spreading the cost) through a damage award.
Second, under the principle of a breach of equality before public
268. Case 228/84, Pauvert v. Ct. of Auditors, E.C.R. 1969 (1985).
269. Id.
270. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 171.
271. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968).
272. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 171.
273. CE 28/3-19 Regnault-Desroziers RDP 1919, 239
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burdens (6galit6 devant les charges publiques) 274 any decision that is
in the public interest that causes abnormal harm to a limited class of
people must be followed by compensation. The compensation under
either principle is provided under a no-fault standard. 275
In relation to informal representations, it is accepted that the
administration can be liable for loss caused by misrepresentation of
its officers. 276 An incorrect representation of fact, law or intent relied
upon by someone acting with no fault of their own makes the
administration prima facie liable.277 For example, in the case of
Aubin,278 Mr. Aubin was advised by French authorities to apply for
unemployment benefits in Belgium, even though he was not entitled
to them. Registration there precluded him from registering for such
benefits in France. The Conseil d'Etat held that the French authorities
were liable for Mr. Aubin's loss, even though the information was
part of a general advisory service and the correct interpretation of the
Belgian and European Community rules was not clear.
Where the administration wants to change a representation that
was not an error, damages are less broadly provided for. French law
allows the administration to change such a representation, as noted
above, and does impose liability under the doctrine of breach of non-
contractual promise.279 However, liability is limited. First, the
administration has to make a clear and unqualified statement of
intent-a promise-beyond consultations and preparations. 280
Second, the courts balance the citizen's reliance with the public
interest that led the administration to go back on the representation,
and the damages will be reduced - or not awarded - if there were
compelling reasons for the change.281
274. CE Sect., Nov. 30, 1923, Rec. Couiteas 789.
275. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 172.
276. CE Sect., July 5, 1949, Aubery Rec 37; CE Sect. Dec. 21, 1950, Feiz Karam Rec
612 ; CE Oct. 18, 1957, Bouveret Rec 542 ; CE Sect.une, 25, 1954, Otto Rec 380;
SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 220.
277. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 220.
278. CE Sect. Jan. 20, 1988, Aubin RDP 903.
279. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 224.
280. TA Paris 14/10-97 Soci~ts Batignolle DA 1998 no. 118; SCHONBERG,
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 224.
281. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 225.
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Causation and remoteness requirements may limit the extent of
damages for both decisions and representations. Especially in
relation to unlawful decisions or representations - often the
unlawfulness itself leads to dismissal, under the assumption that
even without the unlawfulness, the plaintiff would not get what they
asked for. This is especially true if the unlawfulness was
procedural. 282 In Dame Deux, the national medical insurance refused
to reimburse certain medical procedures without a hearing. The
damages claim failed because the owner did not comply with legal
requirements and would not have gotten reimbursement because of
that, regardless of a hearing, according to the Conseil d'Etat.283
The Caladou case is an example of informal representation. 284 In
Caladou, the plaintiff received incorrect information about a time limit
and therefore lost his opportunity to apply for war damage
compensation. The Conseil d'Etat assessed his claim and found that
it would probably not have met the legal requirements for providing
the compensation. Therefore, the incorrect advice caused no loss, and
the administration was not actually liable.285  The causation
requirement limits compensation on a case-by-case basis, but the
principle still stands: the injured citizen can appeal and try and prove
her damages.
D. Comparison
What the previous sections suggest is that while all three
countries offer some protection for reliance, none of them offers it in
every case - it is a case-by-case analysis in each country. All countries
provide much less protection, if any, to clearly unlawful
representations. All of them consider both the harm to the individual
and the harm to the public interest. Also, France, Israel and to a lesser
extent, England, provide a monetary damage remedy.
There are substantial differences in the political and legal
structure and features of the three countries. Specifically, the United
States is a federal country, while the U.K., France and Israel are
unitary. This could affect the ability of the center to control the local
282. Id. at 200-201.
283. CE Sect. Jan. 20,1988, Aubin RDP 903.
284. CE Sect. Nov. 18, 1960, Caladou AJDA 190.
285. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 120, at 231.
[Vol. 38:1
Administrative Estoppel
units, and give more weight to the needs of the center to control
others by not making the representations of local offices binding.
This issue has been addressed in some detail in section II.C., but while
collusion between a local office and a regulated party is not
impossible, my conclusion is that the concern is not sufficient to
justify a hard line on estoppel in the United States. To repeat the main
points raised, it is unlikely that the possibility of estoppel will be what
determines local disobedience, because if collusion is discovered, that
is the justification to overturn the decision. In addition, the decision
is not a way to overturn a general rule, since it is unlikely to govern
future cases because an error is an appropriate reason for an agency
to decide other cases differently; and even a repeated error would
only bind the agency in narrow circumstances under current
jurisprudence. I would add that agency centers have other
mechanisms to control lower offices that are more direct. Finally,
even if a doctrine of estoppel could encourage subversion by a local
office, that would need to be balanced with the more common
scenario where there is just an error on the part of the local office, and
the harm to the citizen is from that error.
Another difference is that the United States is a presidential
system; the U.K. and Israel are both parliamentary, with a different
model of separation of powers, and France is semi-presidential and
has unique features. It is not clear, however, as explained in section
II, that this difference affects the basic problem. In most cases, the
worst tension is between the framework provided for by a democratic
legislature and representations offered by the executive branch,
which is mostly a professional bureaucracy. In a parliamentary
system, the political executive is part of the legislature, the executive
branch is mostly civil servants and the process for statutory changes
still has to be followed. In both parliamentary and non-parliamentary
systems, civil servants do not have the authority to deviate from
statutes independently; and value is placed on citizen reliance, trust
in government, and administrative efficiency. The dilemma seems
similar enough for the solutions developed in other, admittedly
different, systems to be applicable to the United States.
IV. Solutions to the Dilemma
Combining the analysis of the arguments on both sides with the
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comparative analysis suggests that while the concerns about the rule
of law are real enough, there are competing interests. Harm to the
individual's interests, as well as harm to individual autonomy, and
even to the functioning of the public administration, support
protection of reliance in certain cases. The countervailing concerns,
however, do not support automatic or constant protection, at least not
if done through enforcement.
This section addresses two potential solutions to the problem,
solutions that can operate simultaneously and cover different
situations. The first is direct enforcement of the decision relied upon.
In that, I am breaking no new ground, aside from the previous
discussion of the considerations behind the decision: I am
recommending Schwartz's excellent proposal, though I am
qualifying it. In the second part, I recommend a monetary remedy
and suggest both a judicial way to arrive there and a potential
legislative change.
A. Providing for Direct Enforcement in Appropriate Cases
In his article, Schwartz 286 builds on existing doctrines of
administrative law to allow limited, case-by-case reliance in
appropriate cases. He suggests a two-way process the court should
use. Under Schwartz's two-stage approach, the first stage will draw
on the Supreme Court's approach in Lyng v. Payne.287 Schwartz
suggests that in all estoppel cases the plaintiff will first be required to
explain the problem to the agency and request a remedy. If there is a
statute, regulation or other policy, the plaintiff should request a
waiver of those policies. 288 If the agency refuses the waiver, the
plaintiff can then appeal, and the agency's decision to refuse the
waiver will be examined under the Administrative Procedures Act's
standard for judicial review, under which agency action may be set
aside if it's "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion."289
In examining the agency's decision, the court will consider
whether the agency had authority to grant the waiver, and "the
286. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 698.
287. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926 (1986).
288. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 698.
289. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. §706(2)(A) (2014); Schwartz, supra
note 5, at 698.
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relationship between the legislative regulation that the agency
allegedly has violated, together with its purposes, and the body of
law, application of which is sought to be estopped, along with its
policies. The impact of the estoppel remedy on the policies
underlying the latter body of law must be considered as well as the
availability and adequacy of alternative non-estoppel remedies. The
ultimate inquiry is whether it is reasonable for the agency to insist on
strict enforcement of the particular pieces of law it favors, in the face
of its own particular lawless conduct." 290 This allows the court to
focus on the heart of the matter: should reliance be protected, when
comparing the harm to the individual with the harm to the public
interest from enforcement? Can the agency's decision be supported?
It does, however, subject the doctrine to all the problems surrounding
the arbitrary and capricious standard.
Courts' interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard
has been riddled with internal contradictions since the Supreme
Court in Overton Park291 said: "Although this inquiry into the facts is
to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a
narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency." Is the standard, therefore, searching or
narrow? Scholars disagree on how to interpret the standard.292 Some
emphasize the need for close review of agency action,293 while others
highlight the problems it causes to agency operation, including
ossifying agency action, giving interest groups a tool to sabotage
decision making, and forcing agencies to focus on potential litigation
rather than substance. 294 Despite the disagreements, the statutory
standard of review, "arbitrary and capricious," is flexible and hence
290. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 698-99.
291. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, (1971).
292. THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND ADMINISTRATION 158-60 (Praegers
Publishers 1993); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 T. L. Rev. 483,
514 (1997); Patricia M. Wald, Making Informed Decisions on the District of Columbia
Circuit, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 135,138 (1982); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1382 (1991-1992) [hereinafter
McGarity Some Thoughts].
293. Seidenfeld, supra note 295, at 524.
294. McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 295, at 1419, 1451-1453.
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suitable in this context.
Schwartz' second stage applies to a small subset of cases
characterized by harm to an important liberty or property interest
and really unfair government behavior and a situation where the only
way to cure a deprivation of due process is estoppel, he suggests
application of a test of "remedial due process, based on Mathews v.
Eldridge."295 This test would allow the court to balance the private
interest with the government interest, and arrive at an appropriate
result, taking all considerations into account.296 His approach has the
advantage of using tools courts are already familiar with, allowing
for flexibility, building in considerations of the public interest, and
increasing protection of reliance. It is reasonably clear yet flexible,
allowing case-by-case assessment. It also takes into consideration the
rule of law. It has the disadvantages of probably creating room for
more litigation (it's hard to predict whether there will, in fact, be more
litigation as a result of this), reducing clarity by using a vague
standard, and is vulnerable to the arguments raised against the hard
look doctrine elsewhere.
B. A Monetary Remedy
In at least two situations, direct enforcement will be
inappropriate, but there may still be good reasons to provide some
remedy. One situation is where the agency's representation is in
direct contradiction to a statute. In that scenario, as we have seen, no
system offers direct, unconditional enforcement because the concerns
about legality and separation of powers are strongest. The other
situation is where the balance of considerations does not support
direct enforcement, but the citizen will be unfairly harmed without a
remedy. The example of the plant in the beginning of this paper is
one of those: The plant sought to comply with the law, asked the EPA
for instructions on how to do that, invested money, and now is facing
potential denial of permit. Denying the permit because of erroneous
government advice, causing financial loss, seems unfair. On the other
hand, allowing the plant to pollute water, and harming the
environment and potentially harming the health of humans and other
life forms is also problematic. One way out of the dilemma is to
295. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 739-40.
296. Id. at 740-41.
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provide a monetary remedy in those situations, tailored to the specific
harms to the individual.
Is there a legal tool to do so? This paper suggests two legal paths:
an extension of Takings doctrine, following what the Court did in
Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto,297 and a legislated remedy.
1. Extending Takings
An interesting line of cases related to takings may suggest a
judicial solution, even though context and area are different. The
Fifth Amendment reads: "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation." 298 This has been interpreted
as preventing government from "forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole[.]" 299 This question is handled on a case by case
basis.300 The courts identified three factors of particular significance:
"the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and
its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations." 301
In Monsanto, the Court applied this doctrine to a situation that
sounds a lot like the estoppel cases discussed here. At issue, were
certain health, safety, and environmental data the Monsanto
Company had submitted to the EPA.302 Monsanto considered these
data trade secrets, but willingly submitted them to the EPA as part of
the process to register new pesticides. 303 This process was governed
by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).304
FIFRA was originally concerned with the licensing of labeling of
statutes, thus its original incarnation was silent on the use and
disclosure of health and safety data.305 In 1972, FIFRA was updated
in a way that prevented EPA from publicly disclosing any data that
was considered a "trade secret" and also limited EPA's ability to use
297. Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984).
298. U.S. Const. amend. V.
299. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,123 (1978).
300. Id. at 124.
301. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
302. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 998.
303. Id. at 998, 1004.
304. 7 U.S.C. chapter 6 (s. 136 and on).
305. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 991, 1008.
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one applicant's health, safety, and environmental data in considering
a subsequent application if that data were designated a "trade
secret."306 What a "Trade secret" was was never defined, and the EPA
interpreted the term as limited to formulae and manufacturing
processes, whereas applicant firms argued that "trade secrets" should
include health, safety, and environmental data. Several court
decisions supported the position taken by the applicant firms.30 7 In
1978, Congress amended FIFRA to resolve this dispute, allowing EPA
to use most health, safety, and environmental data submitted after
the date the statute became effective in considering other
applications, provided the new applicant offered some compensation
to the original submitter.308 The amendment also allowed EPA to
disclose as much of this data to the general public as necessary. 309
Monsanto argued that these new provisions were an
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. It had spent
over $23.6 million to develop the health, safety, and environmental
data for its application.310 The company considered the health, safety,
and environmental data to be trade secrets. The value of the data
would be destroyed by any public disclosure.31' The district court
agreed and concluded that allowing the EPA to consider Monsanto's
data when evaluating other applicants would "give Monsanto's
competitors a free ride at Monsanto's expense." 312
The analysis centered on the third Penn Central factor of
"reasonable investment-backed expectation" because the Court
found that the force of this factor was so overwhelming as to be
dispositive.313 The Court split the decision into pre 1972, 1972-1978
and post 1978 periods, but our focus is on the 1972-1978 period. For
this period, the 1972 amendments allowed companies to protect data
from disclosure by designating them as trade secrets and prohibited
306. Id. at 992.
307. Id. at 993.
308. Id. at 993-94.
309. Id. at 1006.
310. Id. at 998.
311. Id. at 999.
312. Id. (citations omitted).
313. Id. at 1005.
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the EPA to disclose such data.314 Thus, "the Federal Government had
explicitly guaranteed to Monsanto . . . an extensive measure of
confidentiality and exclusive use. This explicit governmental
guarantee formed the basis of a reasonable investment-backed
expectation." If the EPA were to either disclose or consider data
submitted during this period designated as trade secrets, the agency
would "frustrate Monsanto's reasonable investment-backed
expectation[s.]315
There are a few issues to highlight here. First, the guarantee here
was in a statute, as is true for Monsanto's progeny.316 However, that
does not mean we cannot extrapolate from this line to administrative
actions, even those in violation of statute. After all, the constitution
governs administrative actions as well as statutes. This line of cases
offers a case-by-case method to examine whether a monetary remedy
is appropriate. As explained below, the remedy can be tailored to
take into consideration the public interest. It also helps solve the
Court's dilemma in Richmond. If the Court is concerned about the
Appropriation Clause, then it may not be allowed to provide direct
monetary disbursement without congressional authorization, but
may be allowed to compensate justifiable reliance based on another
Constitutional clause -the Fifth Amendment.
Second, the Monsanto Court itself emphasized the element of
reasonable, investment-backed expectation. That element is not
always met, however. In Jane's case, for example, when Jane was
applying for benefits, she did not have any relevant investments. The
Court in Monsanto did not define what reasonable, investment-
backed expectation means.317 It did mention Monsanto's expenses
and the value of the data to Monsanto when describing the data.318 In
Nollan,319 a case examining a permit to build a larger residence on the
314. Id. at 1011.
315. Id.
316. Which will be discussed in the next paragraphs.
317. The Court simply stated that, "the Federal Government had explicitly
guaranteed to Monsanto and other registration applicants an extensive measure of
confidentiality and exclusive use. This explicit governmental guarantee formed the
basis of a reasonable investment-backed expectation." Id. at 1011.
318. Id. at 998.
319. Nolan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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land, the government granted the permit conditional on an easement,
but the Court did not seem to demand previous investment, focusing
instead on the Nolans' right to build on their property - in contrast to
Monsanto's request of registering an insecticide. 320 The third circuit
in Tri-Bio Laboratories upheld the FDA's decision refusing to allow a
company to use the health and safety data submitted by the original
manufacturer to support its generic drug application, on the grounds
that it would be considered a taking. The court did not expressly
emphasize investment, but instead emphasized the manufacturer's
property interest in the data.321 In short, the courts following
Monsanto seemed to emphasize the strength of the private interest (as
in Nolan) or of the reliance, rather than the need for investment per
se. This means it can be applied to the situations discussed here.
The last point is whether the doctrine allows consideration of the
public interest. Although that was not the focus of the cases, the
public interest seems embedded in the court's analysis of the extent,
though not the existence, of the taking. Courts vary in their balancing,
but all seem to consider the public interest to some degree. The
variation in the effect is not surprising given the court's
acknowledgment that the inquiry on takings is very much "ad hoc,
factual." 322 For example, the court in Monsanto notes that sharing the
data is important for the EPA and for public good and restricting Penn
Central from building on top of the train station protects a historical
landmark.323 On the other hand, an easement granted for public to
access a beach is not enough of a public interest and the court in Nolan
seemed to give the interest less weight.324 Similarly, the Third Circuit
in Tri-Bio Laboratories325 and the First Circuit in Phillip Morris found
that governmental agencies could not share the data from the
corporations without compensation -regardless of the obvious good
for public health and safety.326
The conclusion I suggest is that courts expressly extend the
320. Id. at. 833.
321. Tri-Bio Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 137, 141 (3rd Cir. 1987).
322. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005.
323. Id.; see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
324. Penn Central, 483 U.S. at 825.
325. Tri-Bio Labs, 836 F.2d at 141.
326. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 38 (1st Cir. 2002).
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Monsanto line of cases to cover cases where there was citizen reliance,
but estoppel is not an appropriate remedy. In those situations, the
Taking Clause can be the basis for a monetary remedy. Courts should
focus on the facts of the case, the degree of reliance, the
reasonableness of the reliance, and the reasons for the takings in
assessing the extent of the damages.
2. The Reliance Act
An alternative to both Schwartz's solution and a takings remedy
is to enact a legislative act that would protect reliance. The act should
address both situations that would be required to qualify as well as
the remedy. The advantage of the statutory route is that it can offer
a change without having to wait for an appropriate case to make its
way to the Supreme Court, which, given the Court's previous
estoppel jurisprudence, may take a while. The statute can also set out
guidelines. Statutes have also been passed before protecting reliance,
so there is precedent for enacting one like this.327
What should the act say?
PROTECTION OF RELIANCE ACT:
1. If an individual or corporation demonstrates that:
a. The individual or corporation received:
i. Individualized advice from government
on how to comply with a legal
requirement. Or
ii. A promise from the government as to
how a certain requirement will be
enforced. Or
iii. Another individualized representation on
which the government should have
known the affected person would rely.
b. Relied on that advice.
c. And would suffer harm if the government went
back on its advice, representation or promise,
The citizen is entitled to one of the remedies offered in
section 2.
327. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 653.
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2. Remedies: An agency or reviewing court will provide
the affected person with the most equitable remedy,
balancing the harm to the individual with the public
interest.
a. Direct enforcement of the initial representation,
notwithstanding any statutory provision to the
contrary.
b. Monetary damages in an amount sufficient to
compensate the affected person for her reliance.
3. The government may not award a remedy if it
demonstrates that reliance on the advice, promise or
representation was unreasonable.
Conclusion
In Merrill, the Supreme Court decided that the cost of protecting
reliance is too high. In hindsight, it seems the Court did not give
sufficient weight to the harm the individual suffers from such a
doctrine and may have overestimated the public dangers. The
Court's concern about separation of powers and legality are real
enough and powerful -but they do not call for the stringent estoppel
doctrine that the Court used. This article suggests that there are at
least two ways to soften the doctrine: a judicial remedy and a
legislative one.
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